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Given its potential for a large variety of real-life applications, smartphone
crowdsensing has recently gained tremendous attention from the research community.
Smartphone crowdsensing is a paradigm that allows ordinary citizens to participate
in large-scale sensing surveys by using user-friendly applications installed in their
smartphones. In this way, fine-grained sensing information is obtained from smart-
phone users without employing fixed and expensive infrastructure, and with negligible
maintenance costs.
Existing smartphone sensing systems depend completely on the participants’
willingness to submit up-to-date and accurate information regarding the events being
monitored. Therefore, it becomes paramount to scalably and effectively determine,
enforce, and optimize the information quality of the sensing reports submitted by the
participants. To this end, mechanisms to improve information quality in smartphone
crowdsensing systems were designed in this work. Firstly, the FIRST framework
is presented, which is a reputation-based mechanism that leverages the concept of
“mobile trusted participants” to determine and improve the information quality of
collected data. Secondly, it is mathematically modeled and studied the problem of
maximizing the likelihood of successful execution of sensing tasks when participants
having uncertain mobility execute sensing tasks. Two incentive mechanisms based on
game and auction theory are then proposed to efficiently and scalably solve such prob-
lem. Experimental results demonstrate that the mechanisms developed in this thesis
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, smartphones have become ubiquitous in our lives. According
to 2014 Ericsson’s mobility report [26], 8.4 billion smartphones will be active world-
wide in 2020. These devices are equipped with rich multi-modal sensors, that provide
information such as location, acceleration, temperature, and noise. In the near future,
additional capabilities are envisioned, such as detecting pollution, lighting conditions,
and more. These technological features, have contributed to the emergence of appli-
cations based on a new and promising paradigm known as smartphone crowdsensing∗.
1.1. SMARTPHONE CROWDSENSING
The main idea behind smartphone crowdsensing is to enable ordinary citizens
to actively monitor various phenomena pertaining to themselves (e.g., health, social
connections) or their community (e.g., environment). For example, the cameras on
smartphones can be used as video and image sensors [7], the microphone can be used
as an acoustic sensor [20], and the embedded global positioning system (GPS) receiver
can be used to gather accurate location information, while gyroscopes, accelerome-
ters, and proximity sensors can be used to extract contextual information about the
user (e.g., if the user is driving [67]). Further, additional sensors can be easily inter-
faced with the phone via Bluetooth or wired connections (e.g., temperature sensors
[81]). Real-life applications, which can take advantage of both low-level sensor data
and high-level user activities, range from real-time traffic monitoring applications like
∗For the sake of generality, in this thesis the term smartphone crowdsensing will be used to desig-
nate applications where participants voluntarily contribute sensor data for their own benefit and/or
the benefit of the community by using their phones. Such a notion therefore includes mobiscopes
[1], opportunistic sensing [10], and equivalent terms such as mobile phone sensing, participatory
sensing [47], or simply crowdsensing. It also covers specific terminologies focusing on particular
monitoring subjects, such as urban sensing [10], citizen sensing [9], people-centric sensing [10], [11],
and community sensing [45].
2Nericell [63] or Waze [87] to air [19, 59, 68] and noise pollution [59, 73], social net-
working [62], crime monitoring [12], smart parking and so on [30, 66, 67, 69, 92]. An
excellent survey of applications based on the smartphone crowdsensing paradigm may
be found in [42].
Although a clear consensus on the best architecture for smartphone crowd-
sensing systems has not been reached yet, the majority of the existing smartphone




Figure 1.1. Smartphone crowdsensing architecture.
In particular, volunteers† use mobile phones to collect sensor data and submit
via wireless data communication links to a smartphone crowdsensing platform (SCP)
located in the cloud. The crowdsensing tasks on the phones can be triggered manually,
automatically, or based on the current context [17]. On the SCP, the data is analyzed
and made available in various forms, for example, graphical representations or maps
showing the sensing results at an individual or community scale. The results may
be displayed locally on the users’ mobile phones or accessed by the broader public
†In this thesis, we will use the words “users”, “participants”, and “volunteers” interchangeably
to indicate a person contributing to the smartphone crowdsensing campaign.
3through web-portals, depending on the application needs. Three are usually the
components of a smartphone crowdsensing system.
• The main component of the system are the users, whose task is to use their
smartphones (and in particular, the sensing application) to capture different
kinds of sensor data, such as location, images, sound samples, accelerometer
data, biometric data, and barometric pressure. However, opinions about the
sensing area or an environmental phenomenon, for example, traffic status or
weather information, may also be provided by the users. In practical implemen-
tations of smartphone sensing systems, users typically register with the system
by providing using a username and password [87] that allows their contributions
to be uniquely identified.
• The sensing application (app), deployed on the users’ smartphones, is dis-
tributed through common application markets like Google Play or App Store,
or is retrieved from a mobile cloud computing system [27]. It is responsible for
providing the users with a friendly user interface for data acquisition and visual-
ization. In particular, data acquisition may be triggered by the users themselves
or may be elicited by the app, on a one-time on-demand basis or periodically.
• The backend component of the system is the smartphone crowdsensing platform
(SCP), responsible for the filtering, elaboration, and redistribution of sensed
data, as well as coordinating every operation performed by the system. This
component is usually implemented by a set of servers dedicated to the processing
of sensed data [74]. The PSP also ensures efficient storage and elaboration of the
sensed data coming from the users, which may be stored in relational databases
[32], or databases specially adapted to the management of sensor readings, for
example, sensedDB.
Along with the main elaboration system, the SCP might leverage a reputation
system and an incentive mechanism. Briefly, the target of a reputation system is
4to predict the reliability of the data sent by the users based on their past behavior
[36, 84] so as to filter out unreliable reports. Conversely, the target of an incentive
mechanism is to encourage participation of users by appropriately rewarding the users
for their contributions to the smartphone crowdsensing campaign. Since this work
will mainly focus on these two components, the state of the art research regarding
reputation systems and incentive mechanisms for smartphone crowdsensing systems
will be surveyed in details in Section 2.
Smartphone crowdsensing provides a significant number of advantages with
respect to previous sensing paradigms (such as, for example, wireless sensor networks):
• The lack of a fixed sensing infrastructure dramatically eases deployment and
maintenance costs associated with the administration of the sensing system;
• The sheer number of smartphone users, coupled with the ubiquitousness of WiFi
and 3/4G cellular-based Internet connectivity, allows a level of spatio-temporal
sensing coverage impossible to achieve in previous sensing paradigms;
• The presence of people in the sensing loop provides the opportunity to acquire
opinions along with sensor data, allowing the emergence of complex mobile
applications such as real-time traffic monitoring [82], [87], [95];
• The widespread availability of software development tools and markets for
smartphone applications (apps) makes development and distribution of smart-
phone crowdsensing software relatively easy.
1.2. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS
The most distinctive characteristic of smartphone crowdsensing is that it relies
completely on the voluntary commitment of participants to submit up-to-date and
reliable information to the SCP. This implies that one of the key factors for the
success of smartphone crowdsensing applications is determine, enforce, and optimize
the Information Quality (IQ) of the reports sent by participants. IQ is often defined as
5a measure of the value which the information provides to the user of that information
[8]. In this context, “quality” is often perceived as subjective and the quality of
information can then vary among users and among uses of the information. For
this reason, the definition of IQ for smartphone crowdsensing still remains an open
research issue.
In order to deal with the challenging problem of optimizing the IQ in smart-
phone crowdsensing, existing work has so far mainly focused on addressing two specific
issues that pertain to such broader research topic:
• Estimate and optimize the reliability of the sensing reports. A number of
reputation-based frameworks [37, 74, 85] have been recently proposed to ad-
dress this issue. Reputation-based systems associate to each user a reputation
level, which is estimated and updated over time. The rationale is to improve
the reliability of information by filtering out reports coming from users hav-
ing low reputation, as such reports are most likely to be unreliable. Another
approach that has been followed is to use trusted platform modules (TPMs),
which are hardware chips that reside on the participants’ devices and ensure
that the sensed data is captured by authentic and authorized sensor devices
within the system [22, 33, 76].
• Increase the amount of sensing reports received by the participants over time.
A significant number of incentive mechanisms, mostly based on game theory
citeTadelis-game2008 and auction theory [46], have been proposed [75] to in-
crease the amount of sensing reports received by users. The rationale is to
formulate the incentivization problem as an optimization problem, in which the
mechanism selects the participants and computes their reward so as to maxi-
mize an objective function defined before (e.g., sensing coverage or information
reliability). Rewards usually are given to the users proportionally to their con-
tribution to the smartphone sensing campaign. For example, rewards made may
6be based on submitting a report close to a desirable location [38], how a report
contributes to the social welfare [55, 79], the number of reports that a user sent,
or the time dedicated to collecting and submitting sensing reports [89]
A number of research issues, however, still remain. In particular, the main
issue of existing reputation-based frameworks is that user reputation is updated by
considering contextual factors, such as location and time constraints. Given user lo-
cation and timestamp of reports are easily forgeable quantities, the solution already
proposed may not perform well in practical smartphone crowdsensing systems, where
malicious users can voluntarily tamper with their GPS location and timestamp of
reports. Moreover, existing incentive mechanisms assign sensing tasks irrespective of
the mobility of users over the sensing area. This approach oversimplifies the prob-
lem formalization and subsequent analysis, but may not be applicable to real-world
sensing scenarios where sensing tasks are spatio-temporal constrained. These reasons
motivated this work and the following novel contributions to the state of the art.
• A novel Framework to optimize Information Reliability in Smartphone-based
participaTory sensing (FIRST) is developed, which leverages the collective ac-
tion of mobile trusted participants (MTPs) to securely assess the reliability
of sensing reports. FIRST mathematically models and solves the challenging
problem of determining before deployment the minimum number of MTPs to
be used in order to achieve desired classification accuracy, by also leveraging
a novel algorithm based on image processing. FIRST was evaluated through
experiments leveraging real-world mobility traces of taxi cabs in San Francisco,
Rome, and Beijing, and through an implementation in iOS and Android of
a system leveraging human participants to monitor the attendance to various
events at the IEEE PerCom 2015 conference. Experimental results demonstrate
that FIRST is remarkably effective in optimizing information reliability by re-
ducing the impact of the three considered security attacks, while outperforming
7state-of-the-art literature by achieving on the average a classification accuracy
of 80% in the considered scenarios.
• The problem of maximizing the likelihood of successful execution of the sensing
tasks when participants having uncertain mobility compete for offering their
sensing services is studied. The problem is cast in the context of truthful budget-
feasible reverse auction design with submodular objective function, where the
crowdsensing system is the buyer and the participants are the sellers. After
demonstrating that the problem is NP-hard, two incentive mechanisms based
on game theory are proposed. To deal with a large number of participants,
an implementation on the well-known MapReduce framework is provided. The
mechanisms were evaluated by considering a road traffic monitoring application
that uses real-world mobility traces of taxi cabs in San Francisco, Rome, and
Beijing. Experimental results demonstrate that the mechanisms outperform the
state of the art by improving its performance of 30% and are highly scalable,
obtaining on the average 12x speedup in the considered experimental setup.
1.3. ORGANIZATION
A survey of state-of-art research work pertaining to this thesis is presented
in Section 2. Section 3 presents FIRST, a framework for optimizing IQ in smart-
phone crowdsensing with minimum amount of mobile trusted participants. Section 4
presents the two auctions.
82. AN OVERVIEW TO SMARTPHONE CROWDSENSING
Smartphones are becoming more and more central to our everyday lives. While
early mobile phones were designed to primarily support voice communication, tech-
nological advances helped reduce the divide between what we consider conventional
phones and computers. As this technological gap further diminished, a new paradigm
is fast emerging: people are beginning to replace their personal computers with smart-
phones. The mobility and power afforded by smartphones allow users to interface
more directly and continuously with them more than ever before; smartphones rep-
resent therefore the first truly ubiquitous mobile computing device.
A critical component that opens up smartphones to new advances across a
wide spectrum of applications domains is founded on the embedded sensors in these
devices. Sensor enabled smartphones are set to become even more central to people’s
lives as they become intertwined with existing applications, such as social networks
and new emerging domains such as green applications, recreational sports, global en-
vironmental monitoring, personal and community healthcare, sensor augmented gam-
ing, virtual reality, and smart transportation systems. As such, the global density of
smartphones will provide ground breaking ways to characterize people, communities,
and the places people live in as never possible before.
The advance in smartphone-based applications is enabled not only by embed-
ded sensing, but by a number of other factors as well, including, increased battery
capacity, communications and computational resources (CPU, RAM), and new large-
scale application distribution channels – also called app stores, such as Apple App
Store, Google Android Market, Nokia Ovi Store, to name a few. By mining large
scale sensing data sets from applications deployed on smartphones through the app
stores and using machine learning techniques to analyze the data, it is now possible
9to discover patterns and details about individuals and ensembles of people not pos-
sible before. As a result, real-time and historical sensing data from communities of
people can be leveraged to make inferences at scale, and advancing the design of new
people-centric sensing systems across many diverse application domains [30, 80, 88].
Although a clear consensus on the best architecture for smartphone crowd-
sensing has not been reached yet, most of the commercially available smartphone
crowdsensing application employ an architecture depicted in Figure 2.1.
This figure illustrates the main activities of the sensing and incentivization
processes in a smartphone sensing system. Since this collection of activities is per-
formed again and again over the lifetime of the sensing campaign, henceforth, we will
use the term sensing round to refer to the execution of the following four steps.
Sensing task advertisement. In this phase, the smartphone crowdsensing plat-
form (SCP) communicates to the users the list of sensing tasks that need to be
executed during the current sensing round. In particular, each sensing task specifies
a series of requirements, such as the sampling rate requested [43], minimum sensing
time [41], maximum distance from specified location [83], or task expiration time
[48, 94]. For example, a sensing task might be “report the current traffic status near
the Golden Gate bridge by 5:00PM”. Additional parameters may be sent, such as
quality of information requirements [2, 50]. Sensing tasks can be advertised statically
[24, 28, 89] or dynamically [29, 74]. In some cases, depending on the application,
tasks can be retrieved by the users asynchronously, e.g., each day [49], or whenever
requested by the participants [48].
Private information disclousure. After the advertisement of the sensing tasks,
the SCP collects information about the participating user, often called the type [89]
of the user, which can be leveraged by the SCP to make a choice regarding the
scheduling of sensing tasks. For example, users may supply a bidding value, which is
included in the user type for use in auction-based incentive mechanisms. The SCP
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may collect temporal information about the user, which can be used to determine
the user’s availability to perform sensing services [34]. The SCP may also acquire
information regarding the characterization of the skills of a person [52, 54] and the
incurred cost for the required sensing services, for example, privacy loss [23], energy













Figure 2.1. Sensing and incentivization activities within a sensing round.
User selection and Task scheduling. After receiving private information de-
scribing the users, the SCP selects a subset of users that will submit the sensed
information to the SCP, and schedules the sensing tasks for each user. For example,
users might be selected according to their geographical position [28, 56, 93], or accord-
ing to the submitted bid [89], cost of sensing services [24], sensing effort [52]. In case
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a reputation mechanism is used, users might be selected according to their reputation
value [84, 86]. Furthermore, the SCP may schedule the sensing tasks according to the
temporal availability of the users [15, 29].
Execution of sensing task and data transmission. After being selected and
instructed on the sensing task to execute, a user is allowed to begin performing
the sensing service using the sensing application. The sensing application may be
designed to assist in collecting data according to one of the following sensing modes:
manual, automatic, or context-aware [17]. Data collection might also be triggered by
leveraging the context, occurring upon the detection of an event or condition (e.g.,
clapping of hands, as in [7]). The sensing application handles the transfer of the sensed
data from the smartphone to the SCP, making use of communication infrastructure
available to the mobile phone, such as WiFi or 3G/4G connectivity. For example,
the sensor readings can be transmitted to the server using SMS or TCP connections
[32], remote procedure calls [62], or web interfaces [27]. Recently, opportunitistic
forwarding coupled with data fusion has been proposed as a viable method for data
transmission [56].
Data filtering and Reward assignment. In this phase, unreliable data coming
from the selected users is filtered according to the perceived Information Quality (IQ)
of the reports themselves. If a reputation mechanism is used, the reports are filtered
based on the reputation score of the user submitting the sensing report [84, 85, 86].
Users are rewarded for their services, usually according to the time dedicated to the
sensing services. The information quality contained in sensing reports might also be
a parameter to decide the amount of reward to assign to users [74].
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3. THE FIRST FRAMEWORK
As discussed earlier, the inherent collaborative nature of smartphone crowd-
sensing implies that its success is strictly dependent on the reliability of the informa-
tion sent by the participants. However, it is well recognized that participants may
voluntarily submit unreliable information. For instance, participants may be mali-
ciously aimed at degrading the received service to the other users of the application
by conducting security attacks. In March 2014, to give an example, students from
Technion-Israel Institute of Technology successfully simulated through GPS spoofing
a traffic jam on Waze that lasted hours, causing thousands of motorists to deviate
from their planned routes [6]. These (and similar) attacks are made extremely easy by
smartphone applications (apps) like LocationHolic or FakeLocation [51], which allow
participants to spoof their current GPS location.
To ease the impact of malicious participants, a limited number of mobile trusted
participants (MTPs) may be employed to help build reputation scores in a secure
manner, and thus ‘bootstrap’ the trust in the system [13]. Specifically, MTPs are
participants that are hired by the sensing application to periodically generate reliable
reports that reflect the actual status of the event that is being monitored around
their location. This methodology is being successfully used in the National Map Corps
project [58] developed by the U.S. Department of Geographical Survey (USGS), where
MTPs (in this case, USGS employees) are employed to validate crowdsourced data,
such as the exact location of schools and cemeteries∗. MTPs are also used in the
Crowd Sourcing Rangeland Conditions project [40], where Kenyan pastoralists are
recruited as MTPs by researchers to validate sensed data regarding local vegetation
conditions. The advantage of using MTPs with respect to existing approaches is the
∗Website at http://nationalmap.gov/TheNationalMapCorps/
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capability to tackle malicious and unreliable behavior by building reliable reputation
scores, since MTPs are trusted entities. However, MTPs also inevitably represent
an additional cost for the smartphone crowdsensing system, as MTPs need to be
recruited.
In this section, the following questions will be investigated:
• What is the minimum number of MTPs we need to employ to ensure that the
information quality will remain above a certain threshold?
• How does the mobility of the MTPs affect the optimum number of MTPs
needed?
• What is the impact of non-trivial security attacks on the information quality
when MTPs are employed?
To answer these questions, the MTP Optimization Problem (MOP) is formu-
lated, which aims at minimizing the number of MTPs deployed (to minimize hiring
costs) while guaranteeing the desired accuracy in classifying the collected reports as
reliable or unreliable. However, several aspects make the MOP solution extremely
challenging. For example, formalizing the relationship between the number of MTPs
deployed and the resulting information reliability is significantly complex, since the
latter is heavily influenced by the mobility of MTPs and other users. This motivated
the following contributions.
• After describing the system architecture, a novel Framework to optimize In-
formation Reliability in Smartphone-based participaTory sensing (FIRST) is
proposed, which has three main components. A probabilistic model, called
Computation of Validation Probability (CVP), calculates the probability that
a user report is validated as a function of the number of MTPs deployed and
user mobility. A novel image processing algorithm, named Likelihood Estima-
tion Algorithm (LEA), leverages geographical constraints of the sensing area to
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provide an approximation of the probability that a sensing report will be val-
idated. Finally, an optimization algorithm (MOA) efficiently solves the MOP
by using the results from CVP and LEA, and computes the minimum number
of MTPs required to achieve the desired classification accuracy.
• The performance of FIRST is extensively evaluated by considering a smartphone
crowdsensing (SC) application for monitoring road traffic, where real-world mo-
bility traces[4, 72, 91] are used to emulate the mobility of participants. For com-
parison purpose, the state-of-the-art approaches [37, 74] are implemented. To
test their performance, three security attacks previously defined in [64] are con-
sidered. Experimental results demonstrate that FIRST outperforms the state
of the art and achieves high classification accuracy with relatively low number
of MTPs, and is able to tackle effectively all the three considered attacks.
• The performance of FIRST is further evaluated on a practical implementation
of a smartphone crowdsensing system, which was conducted at the IEEE Per-
Com 2015 conference. In this experiment, an app (for both iOS and Android
devices) was designed, which was distributed to the interested participants (i.e.,
volunteers) at the conference. These volunteers sent reports regarding the con-
ference participation, acting as users of the smartphone sensing system. Results
show that FIRST outperforms previous approaches and achieves on the average
a high classification accuracy of 80%.
The section is organized as follows. Section 3.1 introduces the system model
and the MOP. Section 3.4 presents the FIRST framework and its CVP, MEA, and




The smartphone crowdsensing architecture taken into account (depicted in
Figure 3.1) consists of a smartphone crowdsensing platform (SCP) which can be
accessed through 3G/4G or WiFi Internet connection. The data collection process
can be summarized as follows. First, participants download through common app
markets like Google Play or App Store the smartphone crowdsensing app, which is















· · ·· · · · · ·
Participants
Figure 3.1. System model for the FIRST framework.
Then, the SCP sends (periodically or when necessary) sensing requests through
the cloud to registered participants (step 2). The participants can answer such re-
quests by submitting their sensed data (step 3), and eventually receive a reward for
their services (step 4). Hereafter, the words “participant” and “user” will be used
interchangeably.
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As far as the sensing application is concerned, it is considered a sensing sys-
tem in which the phenomenon being monitored is (i) quantifiable, (ii) dynamic (i.e.,
varies over time), and (iii) not subject to personal opinion. This includes phenomena
measurable with physical sensors, for example, air/noise pollution levels [20], but also
quantities that can only be measured by humans, such as occupancy level of parking
lots [66], gas prices [21], traffic events (e.g., car crashes and traffic jams) [87], and so
on. Furthermore, it is assumed that the range of the sensing quantity being monitored
may be divided up into intervals or categories, which are specific to the smartphone
crowdsensing application but are properly defined before deployment. For example,
in a gas price monitoring system, the range of possible values could be from $2 to
$3 dollars per gallon, divided into intervals of 10 cents each. In a traffic monitor-
ing application, a different category for each traffic event (e.g., “Car Crash”, “Road
Closure”, “Traffic Jam”, and so on), like in the Waze app [87], could be specified.
Moreover, a sensing report is defined as reliable if the quantity being reported falls
into the interval the phenomenon is currently in (or belongs to that category). For
example, if the actual gas price at a station is $2.46, a report is considered reliable if
the reported value falls into the range [$2.40, $2.50).
As far as the security assumptions are concerned, the SCP is considered trust-
worthy in terms of its functionality (such as user registration, issuing credentials, re-
ceiving, processing, and redistributing data). Furthermore, confidentiality, integrity,
and non-repudiation are assumed to be addressed by using standard techniques such
as cryptography and digital signatures. It is also assumed that users may exhibit
malicious or unreliable behavior; such behavior models are detailed below. In the
following, users are assumed to be identified by the SCP via username and password
and some sort of user-unique information (e.g., credit card information), meaning no
sybil/rejoin attacks are possible.
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• Malicious: These users are willingly interested in feeding unreliable reports to
the system; their purpose is to either creating a disservice to other users (e.g.,
fake road traffic lines [6]), or gaining an unfair advantage w.r.t. other users.
• Unreliable: These users are not willingly submitting false information, but they
still do it because of malfunctioning sensors or incapability in performing the
sensing task [74].
FIRST provides a general approach to determine the reliability of each user
depending on his/her behavior. In Section 3.5, three types of attacks are experimen-
tally studied, namely the corruption, on-off and collusion attacks (previously defined
in [64]), and it is proven that FIRST is able to quickly detect the malicious behavior
and discard unreliable reports.
3.2. MOBILE TRUSTED PARTICIPANTS
In this study, the same approach used by the successful National Map Corps
[58] and Crowd Sourcing Rangeland Conditions [40] projects is employed, and use
mobile trusted participants (MTPs) to tackle the attacks described in the previous
section. Specifically, MTPs are individuals who are able and willing to submit regu-
larly reliable reports regarding the phenomenon being monitored or observed. These
reports are used to validate users’ sensing reports coming from nearby, and ultimately
estimate the reliability of those participants. Such estimate is used to classify reports
generated where MTPs are currently not present, as explained in the next sections.
To allow mathematical formulation, the sensing area is divided up into S =
{s1, . . . , sn} sectors, which may have variable size and represent the sensing granu-
larity of the application. For example, in the gas price app, each gas station could be
assigned to a single sector. In an air pollution monitoring application, a sector may
be as large as a neighborhood of a city, whereas in a traffic monitoring application,
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sectors may be as large as a city block. It is defined as U = {u1, . . . , uz} the set of
users contributing to the sensing application.
The MTP report validation process is modeled as follows. In order to validate
user reports, it is assumed that the reports sent by MTPs are valid for a time period
of T units. The value of T is a system parameter that is dependent on the variance
over time of the sensing quantity being measured. For example, in a traffic monitoring
application, a good value of T could be 5-10 minutes, while in a gas price monitoring
app T can be much longer (in Section 3.5.2, the impact of T on the system performance
is evaluated).
Definition 1: Validation of sensing reports. Whenever a sensing report q is
received from a user ui in sector sj, the platform checks whether a report from an
MTP in sector sj was received in the previous T time units. If yes, then the report is
cross-checked with that coming from the MTP. If q is reliable (i.e., falls into the range
of the report sent by the MTP), q is marked as validated and classified as reliable.
Instead, q is rejected if unreliable. If q is not validated, it is classified reliable or
unreliable depending on an algorithm discussed in Section 3.4.
Figure 3.2 illustrates an example in which an MTP is moving over a sensing
area comprising three sectors.
The locations at which the MTP submits a sensing report are marked as white
circles, while users are depicted as black dots. The user reports from sector s1 between
t = 0 and T units are validated by using the MTP report sent at t = 0. Meanwhile,
the MTP moves to sector s2 and generates a new report at time 2T , which then
validates users reports from sector s2 in the next time window. Similarly, the MTP
report at 3T validates the user reports from sector s3 in the time interval [2T, 3T ].
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Examples of MTPs in urban sensing scenarios include, but are not limited to,
professional drivers (i.e., taxi/bus), policemen, employees of the smartphone crowd-
sensing application, or people commuting on a daily basis to their workplace. Hence-
forth, the MTPs will be considered as reliable, in sense that it is implied that their
reports reflects the actual status of the event being monitored. This also implies that
reports originating from the same sector during the same time window are supposed
to be equivalent. The case in which trusted participants can be (up to some extent)








Figure 3.2. An MTP moving over the sensing area.
3.3. MTP OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
It is intuitive that the number of validated sensing reports (and therefore, in-
formation reliability) increases as the number of recruited MTPs increases. However,
in practical implementations, it is not feasible to assume unconstrained budget to
recruit MTPs; the number of MTPs that can be used by the system will be limited
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and therefore, insufficient to guarantee perfect information reliability. The question
is then the following: is it possible to find a good estimation of the minimum number
of MTPs that will allow the smartphone crowdsensing system to achieve desired clas-
sification accuracy? To this end, the MTP Optimization Problem (MOP) is defined
and studied. Before that, the metric of classification accuracy is defined.
Definition 2: Classification accuracy. Let A define the event of the system
considering a report as reliable, and let F define the event of a user submitting an
unreliable sensing report. Let E define the event of erroneously deeming reliable (resp.
unreliable) an unreliable (resp. reliable) report. By definition, it follows that the
probability of event E, denoted P{E}, can be computed as
P{E} = P{F} · P{A | F}+ P{F} · P{A | F} (3.1)
where X is defined as the complement of event X. Thus, 1 − P{E} represents the
classification accuracy of the smartphone crowdsensing system, and will henceforth be
used to evaluate its performance.
The proposed FIRST framework will provide the mathematical tools to relate
the number m of MTPs to the error probability P{E} and the mobility of users.
Let max be the desired maximum classification error probability. The MTP
optimization problem (MOP) is then defined as follows.
Definition 3. MTP Optimization Problem. Minimize m such that 0 ≤ P{E} ≤
max
3.4. THE FIRST FRAMEWORK
Figure 3.3 introduces the FIRST framework, which is made up by three com-
ponents:
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• Likelihood Estimation Algorithm (LEA): It provides an approximation of the
mobility of users and MTPs. LEA is based on an image processing technique
that produces an approximate likelihood based only on geographical information
(i.e., the map of the sensing area).
• Computation of Validation Probability (CVP): This component derives the
probability P{V } of the event V that a sensing report will be validated by
at least one MTP, as a function of the number of MTPs deployed and the
approximate mobility produced by the LEA.
• MTP Optimization Algorithm (MOA): It takes P{V } and computes P{E}, so



















Figure 3.3. Block scheme of the proposed FIRST framework.
3.4.1. Computation of Validation Probability. In this section, the prob-
ability P{V } of the event that a sensing report will be validated by at least one MTP
is derived. Let Q be the set of MTPs competing for offering their sensing services,
and U be the set of users of the application. Let u(i, z, t) be the distribution over the
sector set S of the random variable (r.v.) U tz describing the location of user z at time
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t. Let also q(i, z, t) be the distribution over the sector set S of the random variable
(r.v.) Qtz describing the location of MTP z at time t.
Let us calculate the probability P{Vz} that a sensing report coming from user
uz is verified by an MTP, conditioned to the fact that user uz is currently in sector
si of the sensing area:
P{Vz | U zt = si} = 1−
∏
k∈Q
(1− q(i, k, t)) (3.2)
In the above equation, it is assumed that the mobility of each MTP is in-
dependent, which is sound because it is highly unlikely MTPs would influence each
other’s mobility in any way. The above equation can be explained as follows. The
probability that a sensing report is verified is the complement of the probability that
no MTP is in the same sector as the user. The probability that a sensing report is
verified, irrespective of the location of the user, can thus be computed by using the




P{Vz | U zt = si} · u(i, z, t) (3.3)
The probability P{V } that on the average a sensing report will be validated
can be computed as the average P{Vz} over all the users, which is




Example. Figure 3.4 shows two sensing areas (S1 and S2) divided into the
same number n = 8 of sectors. It is assumed that a total of m = 5 MTPs are present.
For simplicity, in this example it is assumed that the mobilities of users and MTPs






































Figure 3.4. Example to illustrate computation of P{V }.
For simplicity, let us define as `ji as the probability that an MTP will be in
sensing area j and sector i. The corresponding mobility distributions `1i and `
2
i are












0 i = 2, 4, 6
(3.5)
Let us compute P{V } for both sensing areas. First, we need to compute
P{V | U = si} for each si, which is
• S1 : P{V | U = si} = 1− (1− 1/8)5 = 0.49 for every i, since `i is equal for each
sector. Therefore, P{V } = 1/8 · 8 · 0.49 = 0.49.
• S2 : P{V | U = s1} = P{V | L = s3} = P{V |U = s5} = 1− (1− 1/8)5 = 0.49.
P{V | U = s7} = 1− (1− 2/8)5 = 0.76, P{V | U = s8} = 1− (1− 3/8)5 = 0.90,
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P{V | U = s2} = P{V | U = s4} = P{V | U = s6} = 0. Therefore, P{V } =
3/8 · 0.49 + 2/8 · 0.76 + 3/8 · 0.90 = 0.71.
The above example suggests that the likelihood that some sectors will be
more occupied than others significantly impacts on the report validation probability.
Indeed, if the mobility of MTPs and participants is more concentrated, the validation
probability will increase with respect to the case when the mobility is uniform.
3.4.2. Bounding Mobility. Estimating the mobility distributions u and q
is paramount to compute P{V } and therefore, provide a cost-efficient solution to the
MOP. In cases where information about the mobility of users and MTPs is available,
for example, mobility traces of MTPs and users are available, an exact computation
of u and q may be used. However, prior information about MTP and user mobility
may not always be available. Nevertheless, it is need necessary to analyze at least
the worst-case scenario of uncertainty and solve the MOP in any case. In this study,
the well-known concept of information entropy is used to this purpose.
The entropy H(L) of a random variable (r.v.) L having distribution `i ,
`(i) = P{L = i}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n , is H(L) = −∑ni=1 `i log2 `i. If the distributions q
and u cannot be estimated otherwise, the theorem of maximum entropy [39] states
that, without having any information on the phenomenon, we need to consider the
distribution having maximum entropy, which it is known is the uniform distribution.
This theoretical result is particularly interesting, because the worst case perfor-
mance can be studied regardless of the availability of mobility information. However,
in order to obtain better optimization results, it is necessary to find a tighter bound on
the mobility of users. This is because, if the mobility of the users is more restricted,
fewer MTPs will be needed to provide the same information reliability level, which
yields a better optimization result.
In this study, a heuristic Likelihood Estimation Algorithm (LEA) was designed,
to provide a tighter bound on the mobility of users and MTPs, with just knowing the
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sensing area location. This heuristic is based on the following rationale: the smart-
phone crowdsensing systems under consideration are deployed in cities, or anyway
close to urban areas. This implies that the mobility of users and MTPs will be likely
to be almost restricted to the main arterial roads of the sensing areas, or anyway the
zones/roads with the greater amount of traffic (both pedestrian and vehicular). By
restricting the possible area of movement of the MTPs and users, the randomness of
the movement of users and MTPs can be reduced, and therefore, a tighter bound on
the likelihood of sectors can be provided.
To demonstrate this point, Figure 3.5(a) shows the heatmap of the mobility
traces† of taxi cabs in a section of Downtown San Francisco, where the intensity of the
color indicates the popularity of the place. As the figure points out, the mobility of
taxi cabs is definitely not uniform, and mostly concentrated on a few popular places.
Furthermore, Figure 3.5(b) shows the main arterial roads provided by Google Maps
APIs‡. From this figure, it emerges that the roads point out (with some degree of
approximation) the most popular places as shown in the heatmap of Figure 3.5(a).
Let us now describe the LEA algorithm which works as follows. Let us consider
the map M of the sensing area, and divide it into n sectors as required by the
application, where S = {s1, · · · , sn} is the set of sectors. Then, information about
the most popular places (which may be roads/squares/buildings) and the geographical
constraints of the sensing area is acquired.
By using Google Maps APIs§, the main arterial roads on a specific location
area are highlighted. This information is leveraged to mark such places in the map
M , the background of which is further removed to get a black-and-white image of the
†Published in [72], available at http://www.crawdad.org
‡APIs publicly available at https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/
javascript/styling
§Other approaches, such as Open Street Maps (https://www.openstreetmaps.org), could be
also used for such purpose.
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sensing area as shown in Figure 3.5(b), where the black pixels represent the popular
places.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.5. (a) Heatmap of mobility traces vs. (b) Arterial roads.
The LEA is described by the pseudo-code in Algorithm 1. In Section 3.5, it is
shown that the LEA is remarkably effective in approximating the mobility distribution
of users in various settings, by using real-world mobility traces collected in three major
cities in three different continents, namely Rome, San Francisco and Beijing.
The implicit assumptions that LEA makes are (i) the mobility of users and
MTPs is stationary (i.e., does not change over time); and (ii) users and MTPs follow
the same mobility distributions. Although these are pretty strong assumptions, in
the experimental evaluation conducted in Section 3.5 it is shown that LEA provides
a pretty good approximation of the likelihood of the sectors, considering that only
information only from a map are used.
Indeed, LEA is not a fine-grained mobility estimation algorithm. Instead, it
is a simple heuristic that provides before deployment an approximate information
regarding the likelihood of certain sectors with respect to others. If more reliable
information about the mobility is known, it could be used to complement LEA’s
analysis and achieve better optimization results.
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Algorithm 1 Likelihood Estimation Algorithm (LEA)
Input: M , map of the sensing area
Output: ˜`, approximate distribution of mobility
1: S ← set of sectors s1 · · · sn
2: I ← processed image with most popular areas
3: B ← 0 (sum of black pixels in sensing area)
4: for each sector si ∈ S do
5: Bi ← number of black pixels ∈ si
6: B ← B +Bi
7: end for




3.4.3. Solving the MTP Optimization Problem. This section describes
the methodology adopted by FIRST to solve the MTP Optimization Problem (MOP)
defined in Section 3.3. In order to solve the MOP, it is needed to compute the error
probability P{E}. This implies P{A | F} and P{A | F}, defined in Equation (3.1),
must be derived as a function of P{V }.
Here FIRST solves the MOP by providing the mathematical tools that relate
the number m of MTPs to the error probability P{E} and user mobility. In Equation
(3.4), it is shown how to compute P{V } given q and u. By applying probability
theory, it is obtained P{A ∩ F} = P{F} · P{V } · P{A | V } and P{A ∩ F j} =
P{F j} · (P{V }+ P{V } · P{A | V }).
The only unknown in P{A ∩ F} and P{A ∩ F} is P{A | V }, which is, the
probability of deeming a sensing report reliable in the case it has not been validated
by an MTP. Ideally, this probability should be close to 1 when the report being sent
is reliable, and close to 0 when the report being sent is not reliable. To this end,
FIRST leverages the knowledge provided by the reports submitted by the MTPs,
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and computes P{A | V } as follows.
P{A | V } = P{V } · P{F}+ 1
2
· P{V } (3.6)
This formula can be explained as follows. The first part, P{V } · P{F}, repre-
sents the “degree of belief” we have in the users; it is higher when the user is validated
most of the time (P{V } close to 1) and the reports are reliable. The second part,
1/2 ·P{V }, represents the “degree of uncertainty” in the users; it is higher when most
of the reports have not been validated. Note that, as P{V } increases, the value of
P{A | V } approximates to P{F}. Also, if P{V } = 0 (i.e., no MTPs are present),
the system deems as reliable every report with probability 1/2 (coin tossing), which
is sound as there is no reason to be more inclined to accept or reject the report if no
information is available.
It is now presented an algorithm to solve the MOP, called the MOP Optimiza-
tion Algorithm (MOA). The MOA is based on a modified version of binary search
algorithm, called Left-most Insertion Point (LMIP). More specifically, LMIP returns
the left-most place (i.e., the minimum value) where P{E} can be correctly inserted
(and still maintains the sorted order) in the ordered array of the errors corresponding
to a particular choice of m. This corresponds to the lower (inclusive) bound of the
range of elements that are equal to the given value (if any). Note that LMIP can be
applied to solve the MOP due to the fact that P{E} is a monotonically decreasing
function of m (demonstration has not been reported here due to space limitations).
The MOA takes as input the approximate distribution ˜`i provided by LEA
(equal for participants and MTPs), and also P{F}, the desired maximum error max,
and the maximum number mmax of MTPs available. It provides as output the opti-
mum number m∗ of MTPs to be used to achieve the desired maximum error max.
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Algorithm 2 MOP Optimization Algorithm (MOA)
Input: ˜`i, P{F}, max, mmax
Output: m∗
1: min ← CalculateError(˜`i,P{F},mmax)
2: if max < min then
3: return ‘infeasible’
4: end if
5: return LMIP(˜`i, P{F}, max, 0, mmax)
In lines 1-3, the MOA checks with the procedure CalculateError (imple-
menting Equation 3.1) whether the minimum error min obtained with the maximum
number of MTPs available is greater than the desired maximum error max. If this
is the case, then the MOA has no feasible solutions and therefore the algorithm ter-
minates immediately. If not, then the routine LMIP is invoked, which finds m∗ by
implementing the LMIP algorithm.
Let us calculate the time complexity of the MOA. LMIP is a variation of bi-
nary search, therefore its overall complexity will be O(x · logmmax), where x is the
complexity of CalculateError. Such complexity is Θ(n), given it requires constant
time to compute P{E} using Equation (3.1) and n iterations to compute P{V } us-
ing Equation (3.4), where n is the number of sectors. Therefore, the overall time
complexity of MOA is given by O((n · logmmax).
Example 3. In the example of Figure 3.6, it is assumed the ` distribution
equal to `2i presented in Figure 3.4, P{F} = 0.01, mmax = 8 and max = 0.1. In this
case, the LMIP will return m∗ = 4, since it is the left-most element that provides
P{E} ≤ 0.1.
3.4.4. Practical Implementation. In this section, it is described how the
system, after deployment, handles the case in which a report has not been validated
by MTPs (i.e., how P{A | V } is actually computed). For each user ui, the system
30
0.29 0.17 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
P{E}
m
Figure 3.6. Example of LMIP.
keeps track of the number ki of sensing reports submitted, the number k
v
i of sensing
reports validated by an MTP, and the number kri of reports that have been validated
as reliable.
As soon as a report q is sent by user ui, if the report has not been validated
by an MTP, then the report is classified as reliable with probability















After being classified as reliable, reports may be subsequently analyzed by
additional algorithms (for example, [60, 61]) to determine the actual status of the
sensing area by combining or fusing the information conveyed by the reliable reports.
3.5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, the experimental results obtained by evaluating the perfor-
mances of FIRST and comparing it with relevant related work are presented. First,
it is reported the performance results obtained by considering an application mon-
itoring vehicular traffic events. Then, results obtained by using the Participatory
PerCom application are discussed.
3.5.1. Participatory Traffic Sensing. To implement this experiment, the
mobility traces collected from the following datasets were considered:
• CRAWDAD-SanFrancisco [72]: This dataset contains mobility traces of approx-
imately 500 taxis in San Francisco, USA, collected over one month’s time;
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• CRAWDAD-Rome [4]: In this dataset, 320 taxi drivers in the center of Rome
were monitored during March 2014;
• MSR-Beijing [91]: This dataset collected by Microsoft Research Asia contains
the GPS positions of 10,357 taxis in Beijing during one month.
In these experiments, it is considered a traffic sensing application in which
taxi cab drivers report traffic anomalies. Consistent with the example mentioned
in Section 3.1, it is assumed the reports are divided into 4 categories such as “Car
Crash”, “Road Closure”, “Traffic Jam”, “No Event”. Furthermore, sensing areas of
approximately 4×4km square areas are considered, which characterize the downtown
of cities such as San Francisco, Rome, and Beijing. In the chosen scenario, the taxi
cabs report every 5 minutes information about their surroundings to the SCP. The
application was implemented using the OMNeT++ simulator¶.
3.5.1.1. Evaluation of FIRST components. The goal of the first set of
experiments is to test the efficacy of LEA in computing the likelihood of sectors. To
obtain ground-truth information about the actual mobility of taxi cabs, the traces
were processed using OMNeT++. It is assumed that such mobility is unknown,
and the LEA algorithm was applied to the chosen sensing areas to approximate the
mobility. To apply LEA, the sensing area was divided into a grid of 20×20 sectors,
with sectors having the same size as a city block. In Figure 4.2, it is shown the maps
of the sensing areas after the processing of LEA.
Figure 3.8 shows the distribution of the likelihood of sectors and the one ob-
tained by LEA, respectively. More specifically, the figure shows the actual and esti-
mated probability of a taxi to be in each sector of the sensing area. These experiments
conclude that the LEA algorithm approximates well the likelihood of sectors, consid-
ering the scarce information available. This result is extremely significant, as it is
necessary to provide very precise estimation of the classification accuracy of FIRST
¶Available at https://www.omnetpp.org
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as a function of the number of MTPs. Figure 3.9 shows P{E} as a function of the
number of MTPs, calculated analytically by the Computation of Validation Proba-
bility (CVP) component of FIRST. For comparison purposes, CVP is evaluated by
providing as input (i) the distribution computed by LEA as applied to each considered
sensing area (CVP-LEA, represented by a dashed line), and (ii) the uniform mobility
distribution (CVP-Uniform, represented by a dotted continuous line) as the baseline
approximation. Such analytical results are compared with the experiments using the
traffic datasets.
(a) San Francisco (b) Rome (c) Beijing
Figure 3.7. Maps of the sensing areas after the processing of LEA.
In Figure 3.10, the MTP Optimization Algorithm (MOA) is applied to analyze
the number of MTPs that are necessary by FIRST to provide maximum desired error
probability max. Similarly to the experiments shown in Figure 3.9, users sending un-
reliable reports with three probability values P{F} = 0.01, 0.5 and 0.9 are considered.
Figure 3.10 confirms that the San Francisco setting requires the highest number of
MTPs to achieve given max. These results also highlight that FIRST is remarkably
effective in achieving high accuracy with a low number of MTPs. More specifically, it
provides on the average 85% of accuracy with an MTPs per sector density of about
32% in case of Rome and Beijing, and 55% in the case of San Francisco. Note that
higher accuracy values require in general a significant number of MTPs, especially
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when the behavior of participants becomes hardly predictable (i.e., P{F} = 0.5) and
the mobility is highly entropic (i.e., in San Francisco setting).
As shown in Figure 3.9, in all three scenarios, CVP-LEA computes P{E}
with remarkable precision. In particular, the maximum difference obtained is 3.47%,
achieved in the Rome setting. Furthermore, Figure 3.9 shows that the accurate
estimation of the mobility provided by the LEA translates into an improved prediction
accuracy of CVP with respect to the uniform distribution, as CVP-Uniform yields a
maximum difference of 17.02% in the case of Rome setting. Figure 3.9 highlights that
the San Francisco setting requires the largest number of MTPs to achieve a specified
maximum error probability.
In these cases, only a high number of MTPs can guarantee that a sufficient
number of reports are validated and therefore, desired accuracy may be provided.
Indeed, Figure 3.10 also shows that fewer MTPs are needed when P{F} = 0.9 than
when P{F} = 0.5.
Intuitively, this is due to the fact that, when participants send reports ran-
domly, it is more difficult to understand their reliability. On the other hand, when
their behavior is more “regular” (i.e., consistent over time) it is easier to evaluate their
reliability. This intuition is also confirmed by Figure 3.11, which depicts the number
of MTPs needed as a function of P{F}, for three values of desired maximum error
probability max. Figure 3.11 shows that, irrespective of max, the highest number of
MTPs is necessary when P{F} = 0.5.
3.5.1.2. Evaluation of attack resiliency. Based on the behavior models
defined in Section 3.1, the following security attacks are taken into acocunt, which
were defined in other domains and recently cast in the context of smartphone crowd-
sensing [64]. For simplicity, hereafter we will generically use the word “attacker”
for both malicious and unreliable users, and the words “threat” and “attack” inter-
changeably.
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Figure 3.8. Traces vs. Mobility Estimation Algorithm.
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Figure 3.9. Number of MTPs vs Error rate / P{E}.
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Figure 3.10. MOA results.
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1. Corruption attack. This threat models the following strategy: for each sensing
report, the attacker sends unreliable data with probability p and correct data
with probability 1−p. This attack can be carried out by unreliable and malicious
users alike.
2. On-off attack. In this attack, the malicious user alternates between normal and
abnormal behaviors to conceal her maliciousness. Specifically, the adversary
periodically sends n reliable reports and then m unreliable reports, and then re-
peats the process. This attack is extremely easy to carry out but also extremely
challenging to detect and contrast [3, 14, 71].
3. Collusion attack. In this attack, two or more malicious participants coordinate
their behavior in order to provide the same (unreliable) information to the SCP
[35, 57]. The malicious behavior may also include GPS location spoofing, so as
to mislead the SCP into assuming colluding participants are nearby [74].



























Figure 3.11. Number of MTPs vs. P{F} in case of MOA applied to Rome setting.
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FIRST is compared with the FIDES framework [74] and the reputation-based
framework proposed in [37], [Huang 2014]. FIDES uses a modified version of Jøsang’s
trust model to update the reputation of users. This framework inherits from Jøsang’s
trust model a strong sensitivity to parameter tuning. On the other hand, [Huang
2014] proposes an approach which is a improved variation of majority vote, and its
performance also depends on the choice of parameter setting (Gompertz’s function’s,
among others). For implementation, it is used the parameter settings proposed in
the papers, which are reported in Table 3.1. A pure majority vote scheme was also
implemented to obtain baseline performance. If not stated otherwise, in the following
experiments the parameters reported in Table 3.1 are used. Confidence intervals at
95% are shown only when above 1% of the value.





Number of users 1000
P{F} for non attackers 0.01
ar (FIDES) 0.7
au (FIDES) 0.9
Initial reputation (FIDES) 0.5
Reputation threshold (FIDES) 0.75






Initial reputation (Huang) 0.5
Reputation threshold (Huang) 0.5
Number of MTPs (FIRST, FIDES) 400
Number of attackers 500
Attackers P{F} 0.8
On-off steps (10, 10)
Collusion groups 3
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Figure 3.12 reports the false positive rate (percentage of false reports accepted
w.r.t. the total number of reports accepted) obtained by the frameworks when subject
to a corruption attack, as a function of the (constant) attack probability, number of
MTPs (applies only to FIDES and FIRST), and number of attackers. Figure 3.12(a)
and (c) show that the performance of Majority and [Huang 2014] decreases as the
number of false reports and attackers increases. This is reasonable, as both schemes
are based on data aggregation and therefore not resilient to large number of malicious
users and/or unreliable reports. Figure 3.12(a) Furthermore, Figure 3.13 shows the
results obtained under the On-off attack by all the considered schemes. As expected,
the performance of FIRST is slightly affected by this attack, especially when the
percentage of ON steps is less than the OFF one. This is because, the less the ON
steps are, the harder it is for FIRST to decrease the accept probability of malicious
users. However, FIRST is able to achieve a FPR of about 10% in the worst case of
ON=5. On the other side, [Huang 2014] and Majority are instead more affected when
the ON step is greater than the OFF, as it is more likely for them to misclassify sensing
reports when the percentage of unreliable reports/number of attackers is higher.
Figure 3.14 shows the results obtained by running the Collusion attack. The
experiment has been implemented as follows. We have assumed there are k collusion
groups. An attacker belonging to the k-th group coordinates with the other attackers
belonging to the same group by implementing together an On-off attack. In such
attack, during the ON phase the attackers send false reports pertaining to a chosen
sector, the same for every user in the k-th group. The results conclude that [Huang
2014] and Majority are severely affected by this attack, while FIRST tolerates well this
attack by keeping the FPR below 10% by using 400 MTPS, regardless of the number
of attackers and collusion groups considered. This is because FIRST uses MTPs to
validate data and does not rely on data aggregation. Interestingly enough, [Huang
2014] and Majority perform slightly well when the collusion groups are more. This is
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FIRST FIDES Majority [Huang 2014]
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FIRST FIDES Majority [Huang 2014]
(c)
Figure 3.12. Corruption attack: False Positive Rate vs. P{F}, MTPs, and attackers.
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FIRST FIDES Majority [Huang 2014]
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FIRST FIDES Majority [Huang 2014]
(c)
Figure 3.13. On-off attack: False Positive Rate vs. On-off steps, MTPs, and
attackers.
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FIRST FIDES Majority [Huang 2014]
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FIRST FIDES Majority [Huang 2014]
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FIRST FIDES Majority [Huang 2014]
(c)
Figure 3.14. Collusion attack: False Positive Rate vs. P{F}, MTPs, and attackers.
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explained by considering that when the collusion groups are more, less attackers will
belong to the same group, and so it is more likely that a scheme based on aggregation
may perform better.
Finally, in Figure 3.15 we report the probability P{A|V } of FIRST (i.e., the
probability that a report will be accepted when not validated) as a function of time,
in all the considered attacks. In the Corruption attack, as expected P{A|V } con-
verges to the P{F} probability of the attackers. In the On-off attack, FIRST reacts
by decreasing the P{A|V } probability and increasing it in the OFF phases. Same be-
havior is also experimented in the Collusion attack, but in this case, the performance
is not affected by the number of attackers as explained above. As described in Section
3.4.3, P{A|V } is equal to P{F}, because when reports are verified the probability
of misclassification is zero; on the other hand, when the reports are not validated,
we would like that P{A|V } also tended to P{F}, and Figure 3.15 shows that FIRST
achieves such goal.
3.5.2. Participatory PerCom. In addition to the participatory traffic sens-
ing use-case as described above, the performance of FIRST is also evaluated by im-
plementing a smartphone crowdsensing system designed to monitor the attendance
of participants at various events during the IEEE PerCom 2015 conference held in
St. Louis, Missouri, USA. In such a system, the voluntary participants were asked
to regularly submit (i) the conference room they were currently in, and (ii) the (ap-
proximate) number of participants in that room. The goal of the experiment was to
evaluate the accuracy of FIRST in classifying sensing reports sent by participants in
a practical scenario.
The server-side of the smartphone crowdsensing system handling the storage
of sensing reports was implemented by using a dedicated virtual machine on Ama-
zon Web Services. Figure 3.16 shows the screenshots of the Android and iOS apps
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Figure 3.15. FIRST Acceptance probability P{A|V } in corruption, On-off, and
Collusion attacks.
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distributed to the participants‖. The apps provided a simple interface for the partici-
pants to report the room they were in (8 choices, from ‘A’ to ‘H’), and the approximate
number of people in that room (5 choices, ‘Less than 10’, ‘Between 10 and 20’, ‘Be-
tween 20 and 50’, ‘Between 50 and 100’, and ‘More than 100’). In order to recruit
participants, the conference and workshop attendees were asked whether they were
willing to install our app and participate in the experimental study. This way, 57
participants attending the entire conference and workshops were recruited.
Figure 3.16. Screenshots of the smartphone crowdsensing app, Android and iOS.
In order to acquire ground-truth information about the location of partici-
pants, 20 Gimbal™ beacon devices∗∗ were used, which were deployed as in Figure 3.17
‖IRB approval of experiments available on file upon request.
∗∗Available at http://www.gimbal.com
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and which emitted periodically Bluetooth packets that were received by the smart-
phone crowdsensing app. Whenever a user sent us a report, the location of the nearest
beacon was also automatically included in the report by the SC app. This way, it
was possible to acquire ground-truth information on user location.
Figure 3.17. Position of Bluetooth beacons.
To acquire ground-truth information about the number of people in each room,
three people voluntarily acted as MTPs and sent every 5 minutes the actual number
of people in each conference room. Prior to the conference, to evaluate the impact of
the T parameter (i.e., MTP reporting interval), 4 concurrent, real-time classification
processes were implemented, each one taking into account different MTP reporting
intervals (10, 15, 20, and 25 minutes), aiming at evaluating the impact of the length
of the MTP reporting interval.
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During the experiment, it was observed that the number of people attending
a particular event was almost constant during a 10-minute time window. Therefore,
the MTP reports were used to validate all the reports sent in the following 10-minute
time frame. More specifically, a user report was validated as reliable if (i) an MTP
report r was sent during the 10-minute time frame before the user report was re-
ceived, and (ii) the reported number of people in that room was in the same range as
the one sent by the MTP in r. If the number of people in the room reported by the
user mismatched the information acquired by the MTP, the report was considered
unreliable. Otherwise, if no MTP report was available during the previous 10-minute
time window, Equation (3.7) was used to decide whether to consider the report as
reliable, as explained in Section 3.4.4. After the experiment, the ground-truth infor-
mation provided by the Bluetooth beacons and the MTPs was used to calculate the
classification accuracy.
Figure 3.18(a) shows the distribution of the percentage of participants that
had submitted unreliable reports with a given frequency. For graphical reasons, fre-
quencies in the x-axis have been grouped into intervals of length 0.1. Figure 3.18(a)
points out that about 44% of the participants submitted more than 50% of unreliable
reports; moreover, over 30% of participants submitted more than 90% of unreliable
reports when participating. These results make this experiment ideal to study the
performances of FIRST given the number of unreliable reports is significant.
Figure 3.18(b) illustrates the accuracy of the considered approaches as a func-
tion of the MTP reporting intervals implemented in the experiments. These results
conclude that FIRST outperforms existing approaches as far as classification accuracy
is concerned. In particular, FIRST achieves on the average an accuracy of 80.16%, as
compared to FIDES, [Huang 2014] and majority vote which achieve 69.20%, 62.76%,
and 43.38%, respectively. The results can be explained as follows. When the MTP
reporting interval is 10 minutes, both FIDES and FIRST achieve accuracy of 100%,
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because each report is validated by MTPs. As the reporting interval increases, FIDES
performs worse than FIRST due to the challenge in finding a parameter setting which
achieves good performance in all scenarios. In contrast, FIRST does not require any








































Figure 3.18. (a) Frequency of unreliable reports vs. percentage of participants. (b)
Comparison of FIRST vs. FIDES, Majority Vote and [Huang 2014].
Note that the majority vote and [Huang 2014] schemes do not rely on MTPs,
and instead leverage only sensing reports from users to infer their reliability. As a
result, the accuracy achieved by majority vote and [Huang 2014] in Figure 3.18(b) does
not depend on the MTP reporting interval. As far as performance is concerned, Figure
3.18 concludes that such approaches do not obtain accuracy values close to FIRST
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and FIDES. This is due to the fact that approaches based on majority vote are not
resilient to large number of unreliable reports, which is the case of the Participatory
PerCom experiments, as shown in Figure 3.18(a).
3.6. RELATED WORK
Related work can be divided into two main approaches: trusted platform mod-
ules (TPMs) and reputation-based systems. TPMs are hardware chips that reside on
the participants’ devices, and ensure that the sensed data is captured by authentic
and authorized sensor devices within the system [22, 33, 76]. The main drawback of
this approach is that TPMs require additional hardware not currently available on
off-the-shelf devices, implying such solutions are not readily deployable. Moreover,
TPM chips are tailored to verify data coming from physical sensors (e.g., accelerom-
eter, camera). Thus, they are not applicable to smartphone crowdsensing systems in
which the information is directly supplied by the participants.
Most of related work has focused on developing reputation-based systems to
increase information reliability. Specifically, they associate each user with a reputation
level, which is estimated and updated over time. Among related work, [37, 53, 74,
85] are the most relevant. In [85], the authors proposed ARTsense, a reputation-
based framework that includes a privacy-preserving provenance model, a data trust
assessment scheme, and an anonymous reputation management protocol. The main
issue of [85] is that user reputation is updated by considering contextual factors, such
as location and time constraints. Given user location and timestamp of reports are
easily forgeable quantities, the solution proposed in [85] may not perform well in
practical smartphone crowdsensing systems, where malicious users may voluntarily
tamper with their GPS location and timestamp of reports.
Recently, in [37] the authors proposed a reputation framework which imple-
ments an improved version of majority vote. The main limitations of this framework
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are (i) the assumption of constant sampling rate, which is not realistic in asynchronous
smartphone crowdsensing systems, and (ii) the poor resilience to a large number of
malicious users, as the framework uses a modified version of majority vote to update
user reputation levels. To overcome such limitation, in [74] the authors proposed
FIDES, a reputation-based framework that used mobile security agents to classify
sensing reports. Similarly to us, FIDES is also resilient to a large number of malicious
users. However, as in [37], the necessity to set a significant number of parameters
makes the actual performance of the framework hardly predictable in reality. On
the other hand, FIRST does not depend on specific parameters. Furthermore, in
this study it is considered the problem of modeling and optimizing the information
reliability [64].
3.7. CONCLUSIONS
In this section it was presented FIRST, a novel framework that models and
optimizes the information reliability in smartphone crowdsensing systems. First, the
system model, the concept of mobile trusted participants (MTPs), and the MTP
optimization problem (MOP) were introduced. Then, the main components of the
FIRST framework were discussed in detail, which include a novel likelihood estima-
tion algorithm (LEA) and the MTP optimization algorithm (MOA) that provides
optimum solution to the MOP. Furthermore, the framework was extensively evalu-
ated through real mobility traces in the context of participatory traffic sensing, and
by a practical implementation of a system that monitored participants’ attendance
at the IEEE PerCom 2015 conference. Finally, FIRST was compared with state-
of-the-art literature. Results have shown that FIRST outperforms existing work in
increasing information reliability and is able to capture the performance of the system
with significant accuracy.
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4. INCENTIVE MECHANISMS FOR CROWDSENSING
The collaborative nature of smartphone crowdsensing implies that its success
is strictly dependent on the active participation of users. However, smartphone users
invest their personal resources (e.g, time, battery, and bandwidth) while executing
sensing tasks. Thus, a user would not be interested in participating in the crowd-
sensing process unless she receives a satisfying reward. For this reason, a significant
number of mechanisms to incentive the users’ participation have been proposed, as
recently surveyed in [31, 75].
Despite sound mathematical analysis, the main limitation of existing mech-
anisms is that they implicitly assume that participants will always be able to per-
form the sensing tasks assigned to them. However, in most smartphone crowdsens-
ing systems, the contributors are pedestrians, drivers, or people commuting to their
workplace through public transportation [75]. For example, in the well-known traffic
monitoring application Waze [25, 87], participants are drivers or commuters traveling
from one place to another; thus, their mobility largely depends on current traffic con-
ditions. For example, it may not be always possible for a Waze participant driving
in New York City to execute spatio-temporal constrained tasks such as “Submit road
traffic information at Times Square in 5 minutes and Central Park South in 10 min-
utes”. Therefore, the mobility of the participants should be assumed as uncertain,
and specific incentive mechanisms should be designed to maximize the likelihood that
the sensing tasks will be actually executed. Furthermore, the incentive mechanism
should also assume that the budget for recruitment of participants is often limited,
and thus not every participant can be hired by the system.
In this section, the problem of maximizing the likelihood of successful sensing
task execution with participants having uncertain mobility and strict hiring budget
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constraint is solved. The problem is cast in the context of truthful budget-feasible
mechanism design, a branch of game theory that studies how to influence the outcome
of a game towards a certain objective [70]. Specifically, the interaction between the
smartphone crowdsensing platform (in short, SCP) and the participants is modeled
as a reverse auction, where the SCP is the buyer (i.e., the auctioneer), and the
participants are the sellers (i.e., the bidders) of sensing tasks.
Participants compete with each other by submitting a bid containing the ex-
pected payment for executing the sensing tasks advertised by the SCP. The SCP, in
turn, will use the auction mechanism to select the winning bidders and compute their
payment. The goal is to select participants so as to maximize the probability that
the sensing tasks will be executed, and guarantee the total payment will be contained
in the budget. In order to avoid the situation in which participants overbid to obtain
a greater payment, which leads to inefficiencies in the participants’ selection process
[70], the auction must also be truthful, in sense that participants are not incentivized
to overbid by the mechanism.
To effectively solve this problem, the theory of budgeted maximization of sub-
modular functions [44] is leveraged. This theory is used to mathematically model the
Budgeted Value Maximization Problem (BVM) studied in this section, and show that
it is NP-Hard. Two polynomial-time mechanisms are derived, called Truthful Value
Maximization (TVM) and Heuristic Value Maximization (HVM). It is also mathe-
matically proven that the mechanisms guarantee truthfulness, individual-rationality
and are budget-feasible. Finally, to provide scalability, it is also presented an im-
plementation of the mechanisms on the well-known MapReduce [18] framework for
parallel computation.
The mechanisms are extensively evaluated by considering a traffic monitoring
application where taxi drivers submit information about traffic events (e.g., accidents,
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traffic lines, etc.) during their trips. In order to realistically implement the applica-
tion, and experiment with different mobility patterns, real-world mobility traces of
taxi cabs in San Francisco [72], Rome [4], and Beijing [91] were used. Experimental
results demonstrate that our mechanisms outperform the state of the art [16, 77, 89]
by improving on the average of 30% with respect to the existing approaches the like-
lihood of successful task execution, and by achieving a speed-up factor of 12x on the
considered experimental setup with MapReduce.
To summarize, the main contributions of this section are as follows:
• Two incentive mechanisms for smartphone crowdsensing systems that consider
uncertain mobility of participants and are parallelizable on MapReduce are
designed;
• The proposed incentive mechanisms are validated through experiments, and it
is demonstrated that they improve significantly the state of the art and able to
deal with large number of participants.
The section is organized as follows. Section 4.1 introduces the system model,
which Section 4.2 the problem definition. Section 4.3 presents the budget-feasible
mechanisms developed in this thesis. Section 4.4 presents the experimental results.
Related work is summarized in Section 4.5, while Section 4.6 draws conclusions.
4.1. PROBLEM DEFINITION
This study considers a smartphone crowdsensing architecture consisting of a
platform (SCP) which can be accessed through 3G/4G or WiFi Internet connection.
The data collection process is detailed as follows. Hereafter, the terms “user”, “par-
ticipant” and “bidder” will be referred to interchangeably, as well as “system” and
“SCP”.
• Before the sensing campaign may begin, users interested in participating to
the smartphone crowdsensing campaign download through common application
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(app) markets such as Google Play or App Store the smartphone crowdsensing
app (step 1), which is responsible for handling data acquisition, transmission,
and visualization.
• When the sensing process begins, the SCP generates sensing tasks that need to
be executed (step 2). The information pertaining to each sensing task depends
on the sensing application, and specifies a series of requirements, such as the
sampling rate requested, minimum sensing time, maximum distance from spec-
ified location, or task expiration time [75]. For example, a sensing task might
be “report the traffic status near the Golden Gate bridge in San Francisco by
5:00PM”. Depending on the application, tasks can be retrieved by the users
asynchronously, e.g., each day, or whenever requested.
• After the advertisement of the sensing tasks, the SCP collects information that
is used to make a choice regarding the scheduling of sensing tasks. Among
other information, users supply a bid, which is the amount of reward the user
would like to receive to perform sensing services (step 3). Bids are used by the
auction-based incentive mechanisms developed in this thesis to determine (i) the
scheduling of sensing tasks and (ii) the reward to assign to each participating
user. If available, the SCP may also collect mobility information about the user,
which can be used to determine the user’s availability to perform the sensing
tasks.
• After receiving the bids from the users, the SCP runs the auction mechanism,
and according to the auction’s result, selects a subset of users, assigns them
the sensing tasks, and communicates the reward assigned to each user (step 4).
After being selected and instructed on the sensing task to execute, a user is
allowed to begin performing the sensing service using the sensing application
(step 5). The data collection may be manual or automatic, depending on the
application context [42]). The sensing application handles the transfer of the
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sensed data from the smartphone to the PSP, making use of communication in-
frastructure available to the mobile phone, such as WiFi or 3G/4G connectivity
[75]. After the sensing tasks are executed and the data has been transmitted,
the SCP assigns the reward communicated in step 4 to each participating user
(step 6).
4.2. SYSTEM FORMALIZATION
In order to model users’ mobility, the sensing area is divided up into sectors,
which may have different size and represent the sensing granularity of the application.
For example, in a traffic monitoring application, the sectors can be as large as a
city block, whereas in air monitoring applications the sector can be as large as a
neighborhood. We also assume time is discretized, with j being the j-th time slot
between tj and tj+T .
Let S define the set of s = |S| sectors forming the sensing area. Let Q be the
set of m = |Q| participants competing for offering their sensing services. We define as
sensing task as a sensing activity that the SCP needs to be performed at a particular
place and in a particular moment in time. More formally, since space and time are
discretized, a sensing task is modeled as a tuple τi,j = (i, j) where i ∈ S indicates
the sector and j ∈ R+ indicates the timestep (e.g., τ3,4 indicates the sensing task
involving sector 3 at timestep 4). We will indicate as Z the set of sensing tasks.
Is is assumed that participants can leave and enter the system at their will.
For simplicity, it is defined as t = 0 the moment in which the auction is executed.
To model the participants’ mobility, pi,jk will indicate the probability that the k-th
participant will be in sector i at time j. For the sake of generality, the mechanisms
are derived with general pi,jk . In this way, the mechanisms and proofs derived will be
general and applicable with any state-of-the-art mobility model.
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Participants spend resources when performing sensing services, for example,
their personal time, battery, and bandwidth. It is denoted by γk the cost of the k-th
participant for executing a sensing task, which also includes the minimum profit that
the participant desires to earn by participating. This information is considered as
personal, which means that γk is not revealed to the SCP. In general, the participant
may bid a different quantity than γk; it is thus defined νk as such quantity. The bid
is of each participant is therefore the quantity {νk}. It is also defined as B the set of
bids submitted by the participants for the current auction.
Some terms are now defined, that will be frequently utilized in this section.
Definition 4: (Mechanism). Let T be set of winning bidders, and R be the
vector of rewards given to the auction participants. A mechanism M defines a tuple
{α, pi}, where α : B → T is defined as the allocation function of the auction, and
pi : T → R is the payment function of the auction.
Definition 5: (Utility). The utility obtained by the k-th auction participant by
bidding νk and receiving as reward R(k) is the quantity uk(νk) = R(k)− γk.
It is reasonable to assume that the participants are selfish and are only in-
terested in maximizing their own utility as much as possible. To this purpose, they
may overbid (i.e., submitting νk much higher than γk), trying to achieve a higher
reward. This may ultimately compromise the auction’s efficiency and lead to low
performance. To solve this problem, mechanisms that align the users’ interests with
the system goals are needed. This is why in this thesis truthful mechanisms were
designed.
A mechanism is called truthful if any user maximizes her utility by bidding her
real cost γk, no matter how other users may act. It is also required to the mechanisms
to satisfy individual-rationality, which means that any user always gets a non-negative
utility, and to be computational efficient. The formal definitions of these properties
is given below.
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Definition 6: (Truthfulness) [70]. The mechanism M = {α, pi} is truthful iff
uk(γk) ≥ uk(x), for any x 6= γk.
Definition 7: (Individual Rationality) [70]. A mechanism is individual-rational
iff uk(x) ≥ 0, for each bidder k.
Definition 8: (Computational Efficiency) [70]. A mechanism is computation-
ally efficient iff α and pi have at most polynomial complexity in the number of bids.
The user incentivization problem studied in this section is now formalized.
Let us define Vij as a quantity indicating the value that sensing task τij has for the
SCP. Intuitively, Vij models the preference that the system has for some sensing tasks
instead of others (e.g., covering some neighborhoods of a city may be more important
than covering others). For notation simplicity, Vij = 0 if τij 6∈ Z. It is also defined as
W (i, j, T ) the following quantity, W (i, j, T ) = 1−∏k∈T (1−pi,jk ), which expresses the
probability that at least one participant is in sector i at time j (i.e., the probability
that at least one participant will be able to execute the sensing task). Finally, let us
define B as the budget available to the SCP for running the auction, and as z the
maximum timestamp of the available sensing tasks, hereafter referred to as auction
duration.
Problem 1: Budgeted Value Maximization (BVM). Given values Vij and func-






Vij ·W (i, j, T ) (4.1)
Find set of bidders T ∗ and payments vector R∗ such as






Vij ·W (i, j, T ),
∑
ρk∈R∗
ρk ≤ B (4.2)
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The optimization function defined in BVM can be seen as a function that
expresses the probability that the sensing tasks will be executed (each one weighted
with their relative value). It is now demonstrated that BVM is NP-Hard.
Lemma 1: BVM is NP-Hard.
Proof. In order to prove the NP-Hardness of BVM, a reduction from the well-
known Bounded Knapsack problem (BKP) is provided. A general BKP instance has
a capacity B and a set of items Ω = {s1 · · · sn}, where each item si ∈ Ω has a value
vi and a weight wi. The goal of BKP is to find a set S
∗ ⊆ Ω whose items provide
maximum value and do not exceed the capacity B of the knapsack. The general
BKP instance is translated into a simpler instance of BVM, where a single time step
(i.e., z = 1) is considered. It is also assumed each bidder is in a different sector of
the sensing area, the probability of being in that sector is equal to one, and that
the payment rule is such as ρk = νk. This way, the optimization function becomes∑m
k=1 V (k) · Xk, where Xk is an indicator function that is equal to one if a bidder
is in sector k, and zero otherwise. Therefore, a solution to BVM can be translated
into a solution of the BKP instance by setting the value vk of each knapsack item to
V (k) ·Xk, its weight wk to νk, and B as the size of the knapsack. As a result, solving
BVM is at least as hard as solving BKP, therefore BVM is NP-Hard.
From Lemma 1, it is concluded that it is unlikely to design a mechanism with
α∗ and pi∗ in the polynomial computational class, unless P = NP . Therefore, the rest
of the section will focus on designing mechanisms that provide bounded approximate
solution to the BVM.
Although proven to be NP-Hard, the BVM problem has a special property
that allows the design of approximate solutions. Specifically, it is now proven that
its objective function (defined in Equation 4.1) belongs to the family of submodular
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functions. Submodular function optimization theory provides solutions to many NP-
Hard problems [44]. Submodularity is now defined, and some properties necessary to
design a greedy algorithm are proven.
Definition 9: (Submodularity). Given ground set S and a function F : 2S →
R+, then ∀A ⊆ B ⊆ S, F is submodular iff, for any i ∈ S, F(A ∪ {i}) − F(A) ≥
F(B ∪ {i})−F(B).
Lemma 2: The function V(T ), defined in Equation (4.1) is (i) submodular,
(ii) non-decreasing, and (iii) V(∅) = 0.
Proof. In order to prove (i), it is shown that, for sets A ⊆ B ⊆ S, it is true
that ∆A,k ≥ ∆B,k, where ∆X,k , V(X ∪ {k})− V(X) is the increment in value to V
given by the addition to X of a generic element k, hereafter referred to as marginal
























































The braced section in ∆X,k does not depend on X. Thus, it is only needed to
prove the following claim, which is that
∏
y∈A (1 − pi,jy ) ≥
∏
y∈B (1 − pi,jy ) holds for









(1− pi,jy ) , (4.4)
Z ≥ Z ·
∏
y∈{B−A}




(1− pi,jy ) (4.6)
As the quantity pi,jy is a probability and therefore by definition less or equal to one,
the disequality above holds. This proves property (i). Furthermore, property (ii)
derives straightforwardly from the fact that W (i, j, T ∪ {i}) ≥ W (i, j, T ) ∀T , and
(iii) follows from W (i, j, ∅) = 0, by definition of empty product.
4.3. MECHANISM DESIGN
In this section, two mechanisms are described, namely Truthful Value Maxi-
mization (TVM) and Heuristic Value Maximization (HVM) to solve the BVM problem
defined in the previous section.
In order to solve the problem of truthful bidding under budget constraints,
Truthful Value Maximization (TVM) is designed, which is a mechanism that adopts
recent advances in the field of submodular function maximization [44] to provide a
solution to the BVM with proven approximation ratio through a greedy strategy.
Algorithm 3 presents the allocation function of TVM. The algorithm incre-
mentally constructs a set of winners T , initially empty (line 1). At each iteration,
the algorithm picks an unconsidered bidder k∗ having maximum weight, where the
weight is defined as the increase in the function V that k∗ provides, divided by its
bid (line 5). The bidder k∗ is included in T only if the current sum of bidding values
is not exceeded (line 6). and if a condition regarding the new bid νk is satisfied (line
7). The algorithm returns the set of winning bidders T .
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The payment scheme of TVM, which is reported in Algorithm 4, assigns to
each winning bidder a payment corresponding to the critical value, which provably
ensures truthfulness of the mechanism.
Algorithm 3 Truthful Value Maximization (TVM) allocation function
Input: B, B, Q, V
Output: T , Tv
1: T = ∅
2: Tv = ∅
3: Tc = Q





6: if νk∗ +
∑
k∈T νk ≤ B then






8: Append k∗ to T
9: Append ∆T ,k∗ to Tv
10: else
11: Tc = ∅
12: end if
13: end if
14: Tc = Tc − {k∗}
15: end while
16: return T ,Tv
We point out that the critical value of a bidder is the maximum value that
bidder could have bid and still win the auction. Unfortunately, the critical value
computation is complicated by the submodularity of the marginal contributions ∆T ,k,
which implies that the value depends on the sorting order of the greedy allocation
policy.
In order to compute payments in an efficient way, the following strategy is used.
For each bidder i, the maximum of all the possible bids that i could have declared and
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still get allocated are considered, as explained next. Consider running the allocation
function without i. For the first j participants in the marginal contribution sorting,
using the marginal contribution of i at point j it is possible to find the maximal cost
that agent i can declare in order to be allocated instead of the agent in the j-th place
in the sorting. For reader’s convenience, it is now shown a small example of the steps
taken by TVM to compute winners and rewards.
Algorithm 4 Truthful Value Maximization (TVM) payment function
Input: T , B, B, Q, V
Output: R
1: for every i ∈ T do
2: Bi = B − {νi},Qi = Q− {i}
3: T i,T iv = Algorithm-3(B,Bi,Qi,V)
4: X = ∅








j′≤j T iv (j)+∆X ,i







j ∈ T i {min{ρij, νij}} i ∈ T
0 otherwise
Example. Let us consider for simplicity a sensing area composed of 4 sectors
and a time range of only 1 timestep, t = 1. Let us consider the case in which 3
bidders are competing to offer their sensing services. The value of each sector is
V = {.3, .2, .1, .4}, while the mobility distributions of the bidders at time t = 1 are
as follows: p11 = {.2, .1, .3, .4}, p12 = {0, .8, .05, .15}, p13 = {.4, .2, 0, .4}. The bids
submitted are B = {10, 8, 12}.
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Allocation function Input: B = 20, B = {10, 8, 12}





















Append k∗ = 2 to T
Append ∆T ,k∗ = 0.225 to Tv
















Condition on budget (line 7) not fulfilled. Algorithm terminates, and returns
T = {2} and Tv = {0.225}
Payment function Input: T = {2}
• Step 1: i = 2
Run auction without 2 (lines 2-3)
– Step 1-A: j = 1
ν21 = 0.225 · 10/0.27 = 8.33
ρ21 = 10
To win against 1, 2 has to bid 8.33
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Return R(2) = max
j ∈ {1}
{min{ρ2j, ν2j}} = 8.33
We now prove that TVM is truthful, individual-rational, and budget-feasible.
In order to characterize the truthfulness of the mechanism, it is applied the well-known
characterization of Myerson [65] in single-parameter domains, which is reported be-
low.
Lemma 3. A mechanism is truthful iff [65] (i) the allocation function is mono-
tone: bidder k wins the auction by bidding νk, it also wins by bidding ν
′
k < νk; (ii)
Each winner is paid the critical value: bidder k would not win the auction if it bids
higher than this value.
Lemma 4. TVM is a truthful mechanism, i.e., no bidder can increase her profit
by misreporting her true cost.
Proof. Lemma 4 is proven by using Myerson’s characterization of truthfulness
(Lemma 3). In particular, it is first proven that TVM has a monotone allocation
scheme, then it is proven that each winner is paid the critical value.
(Monotonicity). The first property is guaranteed by the greediness of the
algorithm. By lowering her bid, any allocated bidder would only increase her marginal
gain per unit cost and thus be placed ahead in the sorting order considered by the
allocation algorithm.
(Critical value). According to Algorithm 4, each winning bidder i is paid the
following quantity: maxj {min{ρij, νij}}. Let us consider r to be the index for which
Pi = min{ρir, νir}. Therefore, bidding Pi implies that i would be allocated at position
r in the run of the algorithm without i. Four different cases are thus possible.
1. νir ≤ ρir and νir = maxj νij. Reporting a bid higher than νir places bidder i
after the first unallocated user k∗ in the alternate run of the mechanism, thus i
would not be selected.
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2. νir ≤ ρir and νir < maxj νij. Consider some j for which νir < νij. Since r
has maximality condition, it must be the case that ρij ≤ νir ≤ νij. Therefore,
bidding higher than νir would violate the selection condition (line 7, Algorithm
3) and hence i would not be allocated. For some other j such as νir ≥ νij,
bidding higher than νir would place i after j, so i would not be allocated at
position j.
3. νir ≥ ρir and ρir = maxj νij. Reporting a bid higher than ρir violates the
selection condition at each of the indices in j ∈ T i, hence i would not be
selected.
4. νir ≥ ρir and ρir < maxj νij. Consider some j for which ρir < ρij. Since r
has maximality condition, it must be the case that νij ≤ ρir ≤ ρij. Therefore,
bidding higher than ρir would put i after j and hence i would not be allocated.
For j such as ρir ≥ ρij, bidding higher than νir would mean i would not be
allocated at considered position j.
In all four cases, bidding higher than Pi would cause bidder i to not be selected, which
means that Pi is the critical value. Since bidder i is paid Pi, this proves the Theorem.
Lemma 5. TVM is individual-rational, i.e., payments for winning bidders are
always greater or equal to their bid.
Proof. Consider the bid that i can declare to be allocated at position j = i
(i.e. back at its original position) in the alternate run of the mechanism. Therefore,
the payment that i will receive will be Pi = min{ρii, νii}, We prove that νi ≤ Pi.
First, it is shown that νii ≥ νi:
νii =
∆X ,i · νi
∆X ,j




The equality holds because νj/∆T ,j ≥ νi/∆T ,i since i was selected after i − 1 in the










j≤i−1 ∆X ,j + ∆X ,i
≥ νi
(4.8)
The second equality holds from the fact that the first i − 1 allocated elements in
both the runs of the policies are the same. The third inequality follows from the
proportional share criteria used to decide the allocation of i after i − 1 users were
selected already. This proves the Theorem.
Lemma 6. TVM is budget-feasible.
Proof. The maximum payment for a user p is 2 · ∆p∑
k∈T ∆k
·B, where ∆p is the
marginal contribution given by p computed during the run of the allocation function









Lemma 7. Algorithm 3 has complexity θ(m2 · s · z), where m is the number
of bidders, s is the number of sectors, and z is the auction allocation span, while
Algorithm 4 has complexity O(m3 · s · z).
Proof. The complexity of Algorithm 3 is dominated by the complexity of the
while loop (line 4 through 15). At each iteration, the loop computes the quantities
∆T ,k for each k ∈ Tc. As every iteration of loop removes one element from Tc, this
implies that this computation is performed m+m−1+m−2+ · · ·+1 = θ(m2) times.
The complexity of computing ∆T ,k for a generic k is dominated by the computation
of





Vij ·W (i, j, T ∪ {k}) (4.9)
We now provide a way to recursively derive in constant time W (i, j, T ∪ {k}) as
a function of W (i, j, T ). The overall complexity of computing V(T ∪ {k}) will be
therefore θ(s · z), which yields a total algorithm complexity of θ(m2 · s · z).
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= 1− (1− pi,jk ) ·
1−W (i,j,T )︷ ︸︸ ︷∏
q∈T
(1− pi,jq )
= 1− (1− pi,jk ) · (1−W (i, j, T ))
(4.10)
where W (i, j, ∅) = 0 by definition. The complexity is therefore θ(m2 · s · z). The
complexity of Algorithm 4 can be calculated by observing that there are at most m
iterations of the main loop, and in each loop the complexity is dominated by the
execution of the allocation function. This yields a total complexity of O(m3 · s · z).
4.3.1. Heuristic Value Maximization. As discussed earlier, the stopping
criterium of TVM allocation algorithm (line 7, Algorithm 3) limits the efficiency of
TVM. This point is demonstrated through an example.
In the following, it will be referred to as actual budget (B) the budget available
for the current auction provided by the administration, and by input budget (Bˆ) the
budget that is given as input to the TVM selection algorithm. Figure 4.1 depicts
the sum of payments assigned to winning bidders by TVM as a function of the input
budget value Bˆ, where 1000 bidders and truncated normal bid distribution (with
mean=0.5 and support=1) are considered. As it can be seen from this plot, the
sum of payments allocated to the winning bidders is non-linear with Bˆ and remains
significantly below the actual budget.
From this example, it emerges that the performance of TVM can be further
optimized by exploring the input budget space and finding the Bˆ value yielding
the highest sum of payments that remains below the actual budget. Although this
problem might seem straightforward, it turns out there are several issues to be solved.
First, performing an exhaustive (i.e., linear) search on the input budget space
is not practical. This is because, in the worst case, the TVM auction must be run n
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times, where n is the size of the input budget search interval. Although the computa-
tion complexity of TVM does not directly depend on the input budget, in practice the
computational cost of executing the TVM mechanism increases significantly as the
input budget increases. Intuitively, this is because the selection algorithm will select
more winning bidders, which implies that the payment algorithm must calculate the
payment for more winners. Thus, performing the search by running the least amount
of auctions is paramount.






















Figure 4.1. TVM: payments vs. input budget.
Second, while the minimum input budget (i.e., B) is known, the maximum
input budget must be discovered by some means. Therefore, an efficient algorithm
must be designed to define the search interval itself. In order to optimize the compu-
tation time of the optimum input budget without renouncing to efficiency, it becomes
a necessity to leverage the monotonicity of the sum of payments. To explain the
approach, let us assume to have an array A of n elements in which the sum of pay-
ments corresponding to all the input budgets from B to B + n− 1 are stored. Since
payments are monotone with the budget, the array will be sorted. Thus, finding the
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optimum input budget corresponds to finding the rightmost place where the given
sum of payment can be correctly inserted in array A without compromising the sorted
order. Although ordinary binary search may be applied to find such rightmost inser-
tion point, it does not consider that the sum of payments are uniformly distributed
(see Figure 4.1).
Algorithm 5 Heuristic Value Maximization
Input: B, B, Q, V
Output: B∗
1: Bmin = B
2: Bmax = B + 1
3: Bmin, Bmax,Rmin,Rmax = FMMB(B,B,Q,V)
4: while Bmin ≤ Bmax do
5: Bcur = INT(Bmin, Bmax,Rmin,Rmax)
6: Tcur = Algorithm-3(Bcur,B,Q,V)
7: Rcur = Algorithm-4(T , Bcur,B,Q,V)
8: if
∑
k∈Tcur Rcur(k) > B then
9: Bmax = Bcur − 1
10: Rmax = Rcur
11: else
12: Bmin = Bcur + 1




Algorithm 5 introduces Heuristic Value Maximization (HVM), which uses in-
terpolation [5] to improve over binary search and find the optimum input budget
by computing no more than O(log log n) times the TVM auction. First, it finds the
upper bound of the search interval Bmax, by doubling the search interval until the
sum of payments is below the actual budget (line 2).
This guarantees that the interval will be found in O(logB∗) steps. Then,
the algorithm computes each step of the search, called Bcur, by calculating the line
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passing between the two points (Bmin, Rmin) and (Bmax, Rmax) and computing the
next step Bcur as the x component of the point passing by the actual budget B. If
the payment Rcur yielded by the new point Bcur is greater than (less or equal than)
the budget, the algorithm explores the left (right) part of the search interval, until
the exit condition is not met. In order to further speed up the execution time, the
algorithm approximates the Rmax and Rmin values with the Rcur value.
4.3.2. MapReduce Implementation. Smartphone crowdsensing applica-
tions have a large amount of participants. Therefore, it is imperative to take advan-
tage of cloud computing techniques to speed up the execution of large-scale auctions.
Among parallel programming models, MapReduce [18] is widely adopted for many
data mining tasks on large-scale data. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this
study is the first to introduce a MapReduce model for incentive mechanisms in smart-
phone crowdsensing. In this section, it is now discussed the design of a MapReduce
model.
In a nutshell, a typical MapReduce model contains two phases: 1) the map
phase reads the input data, and converts it into key-value pairs; 2) the reduce phase
takes the key-value pairs generated from the map phase as input, and applies an
operation to the values belonging to the same key to obtain the desired output.
For TVM, the objective is to adapt Algorithm 3 and 4 (i.e., selection and
payment functions) to a parallel version. To this end, it is noticed that the main
bottleneck of Algorithm 3 is line 5, which is the computation of the maximum value
of ∆T ,k values, for every participant k. However, each of these quantities can be com-
puted separately by different mappers, and the result reduced to obtain the maximum.
Regarding the payment function (Algorithm 4), it is noticed that the computation
of the payment for each winning bidder (line 1) can be assigned to a different map-
per. The same can be applied to compute line 5. As far as HVM is concerned, the
MapReduce model can be used for TVM to further parallelize the computation of
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the optimum input budget by assigning to different mappers a portion of the search
interval, and then apply a reducer to obtain the result.
4.4. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
In this section,the performance of HVM and TVM is experimentally evaluated
and compared with the most relevant existing work. The scalability of the mechanisms
has also been evaluated by computing the speed-up factor obtained by running the
MapReduce implementation of HVM on a Hadoop cluster.
4.4.1. Experimental Setup. The evaluation has been conducted by emu-
lating an application where taxi cab drivers report vehicular traffic events (similar
to Waze [6]). This type of application was chosen since the results may be valid
also for similar smartphone crowdsensing applications (e,g., urban air/noise pollu-
tion monitoring). In order to obtain real-world participants’ mobility and evaluate
the performance with different mobility patterns, mobility traces collected from the
following datasets were considered:
• San-Francisco [72]: This dataset contains mobility traces of approximately 500
taxis in San Francisco, USA, collected during one month.
• Rome [4]: In this dataset, 320 taxi drivers in the center of Rome were monitored
during March 2014.
• Beijing [91]: This dataset collected by Microsoft Research Asia contains the
GPS positions of 10,357 taxis in Beijing during one month.
The heatmaps of the datasets are shown in Figure 4.2; the pictures show
warmer colors where the mobility is more concentrated. As it can be seen, the mobility
is more concentrated in Rome and Beijing, whereas it is more uniform in the San
Francisco dataset. Therefore, better performance is expected in the Rome and Beijing
experiments (i.e., more users). The sensing area is considered to be approximately
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4×4km square areas, which characterize the downtown of cities such as San Francisco,
Rome, and Beijing.
In this application, taxi drivers request to participate to the sensing process
by submitting the cost for submitting the sensing report through their smartphone.
Whenever the drivers decide to participate, they submit information regarding their
current position and the destination of their trip to the SCP by using a smartphone
app. Upon reception of such information, the SCP computes the mobility information
regarding each participant (i.e., the pki,j quantities as described in Section 4.1) by using
GraphHopper (https://www.graphhopper.com), which provide real-time ETA and
routing information. This information, united with the bid information, is used to
run the auctions mechanisms as described in this section.
To emulate bidders’ behavior, coherently with previous work, the bidding pro-
cess was emululated by using as a Poisson random variable [28]. In particular, each
taxi trip has a duration sampled from a Poisson with λ = 3 timesteps, while each
participant bids happen every λ = 1.5 timesteps. In all experiments, a timestep of
5 minutes was considered, and the sensing areas were divided into 400 sectors, so as
that each sector is approximately as large as a city block. The SCP generates sensing
tasks in such a way that each sector must be covered in each timestep. In order to
account for the uncertainty in the mobility of the users, a Gaussian-distributed noise
with zero mean and std-dev 0.25 to the mobility reported by the participants has
been added. For the distribution of the bids’ costs, coherently with previous work, it
was considered Gaussian-distributed costs with mean 0.5 and std-dev 0.15. In all ex-
periments, 100 bidders were considered, if not stated otherwise. In each experiment,
100 repetitions were performed and 95% confidence intervals were computed, which
are not shown when they are below 1% of the average.
For comparison reasons,the state of the art work due to Singer [77], Chen et





Figure 4.2. Heatmaps of the mobility traces contained in the datasets.
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implemented. In the following, the following performance metrics will be used to
describe performance:
• Percentage of Obtained Value (POV): If P ∗ is the optimum and Pm is the value
obtained by mechanism m, then POV m = Pm/P ∗.
• Speed-up: given execution time E1 and E2, the speedup is defined as E1/E2. It
will be used to compare the execution time of the mechanisms with the one
obtained with running the MapReduce implementation on the Hadoop cluster.
Since the target is efficiency and scalability, these metrics are believed to be sufficient
and appropriate to evaluate the mechanisms. All experiments have been performed on
a cloud computing system emulated by two Dell Precision T7610 servers, equipped
with an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2680 v2 processor (20 cores, 2.80GHz, 64GB
RAM), and by four Dell Optiplex(R) 7010 with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3770 CPU (7
cores, 3.40GHz, 8GB RAM). An Apache Hadoop cluster has been implemented on
top of these machines to evaluate the scalability of the mechanisms.
4.4.2. Experimental Results. Figure 4.3 shows the average percentage of
obtained value (POV) experimented by HVM, TVM, Singer, Chen and Yang as a
function of the allocated budget per timestep, for the datasets San Francisco, Rome,
and Beijing. From the plots the following conclusions can be derived:
• First, it can be inferred that HVM performs better than the other algorithms,
irrespective of the allocated budget per timestep. This is because HVM is sig-
nificantly budget-effective as it uses almost all the available budget at each exe-
cution of the algorithm, while at the same time guaranteeing budget-feasibility.
In turn, the other algorithms suffer from the early exit condition necessary to
achieve budget-feasibility, which significantly affects the optimization perfor-
mance.
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Figure 4.3. Budget vs. POV.
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• Second, TVM increases its performance significantly as the available budget
increases, which is consistent with what expected as the algorithm will terminate
after selecting more participants.
• Third, the performance of Yang, Chen and Singer remains always below 70%,
irrespective of the available budget. This is because Chen and Singer use a ran-
domized selection condition to guarantee budget-feasibility, truthfulness and
bound on performance, but at the same time decrease significantly their per-
formance. The performance of Yang, in turn, remains almost constant as the
algorithm neglects to consider participants’ mobility. Overall, HVM increases
the performances of the state of the art algorithms by a remarkable 30% (29.1%,
average of 30.7%, 30.1.%, 26.7%).
To further validate HVM and TVM efficiency, Figure 4.4 shows the POV as
a function of the probability that a bidder will not be able execute the sensing task
after been assigned to it, defined for simplicity as churning probability (CP). This
might happen, for example, because of problems in the smartphone equipment (i.e.,
battery exhausted, networking issues, or software issues), or because the participant
is in a different sector of the sensing area at the relevant time (or also outside the
sensing area). As expected, Figure 4.4 shows that the overall performance of all the
algorithms decreases as this probability increases. However, HVM is more resilient
than the other algorithms, as the increased efficiency in budget utilization allows to
select more bidders and therefore allow more redundancy in the selection process
(i.e., hire more participants). On the average, HVM achieves 35.2% more utility than
the other algorithms, which makes it ideal in cases when the CP is high (e.g., very
uncertain participants’ mobility).
Finally, in order to demonstrate the scalability of HVM, Figure 4.5 shows the
computation time as a function of the number of bidders and the number of mappers
used in the MapReduce implementation of HVM. For clarity, the execution times
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Figure 4.4. Churning Probability vs. POV.
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were normalized by the same factor, so as to have 1 computation unit in the case the
number of bidders is 200 and 1 mapper job is used.



















  1 mapper job
  5 mapper jobs
10 mapper jobs
20 mapper jobs
Figure 4.5. Execution time vs. Number of bidders.
Figure 4.5 concludes that the MapReduce framework is effective in providing
scalability to the HVM algorithm, as the speedup provided by the additional mappers
is linear; on the average, HVM gets a 12.28x speedup by passing from 1 to 20 mappers.
4.5. RELATED WORK
A significant number of recruitment mechanisms (also referred to as incentive
mechanisms) for smartphone crowdsensing have been recently proposed, as surveyed
in [31, 75]. Research has preferred focusing on designing auction-theoretical mech-
anisms rather than other strategies because of the provable theoretical results that
auction theory offers.
One of the first mechanisms was presented in [38], where Jaimes et al. propose
a mechanism that addresses the coverage problem with budget constraints (shown to
79
be NP-Hard) by greedily finding a set of users that covers the greatest possible area
within a budget constraint. However, the mechanism fails to consider truthfulness.
The problem of guaranteeing a truthful incentive mechanism was explored for the
first time in [89]. In this paper, the authors propose a model where the system
announces a set of sensing tasks, each one having a certain value to the system. Each
user then selects a subset of tasks according to its preference and bids for each of
them. The system then selects the participants so as to maximize a submodular
value function. Although the mechanism shows important properties and achieves
good performances, it does not consider budget-feasibility, participants’ location nor
mobility pattern.
More recently, Feng et al. proposed in [28] an incentive mechanism which
takes into account the location of the smartphone users. Specifically, the tasks here are
location-based, and users can bid only on tasks which are in the sensing coverage of the
smartphone. After proving that optimally determining the winning bids with location
awareness is NP-hard, the authors proposed mechanism consists of a polynomial
time and near-optimal task allocation algorithm, as well as a payment scheme that
guarantees truthfulness. The main limitation of [28] is that the sensing tasks and
users’ positions are assumed to be known in advance and static. A similar mechanism
considering dynamic tasks and users has been proposed by the same authors in [29].
However, in both papers budget-feasibility has not been considered. The closest to
this work are [16, 77, 78], where the authors investigated the problem of optimum
design of budget-feasible auctions in a more general setting.
4.6. SUMMARY
In this section, mechanisms to incentivize the participation of users with uncer-
tain mobility in smartphone crowdsensing were introduced. First, the system model,
the related assumptions, and the Budgeted Value Maximization (BVM) problem were
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introduced. It has been demonstrated that BVM is NP-Hard and that its objective
function is submodular, and proposed two mechanisms satisfying the desired auction-
theoretical property of truthfulness. The algorithms have been evaluated through
experimental analysis and compared them with the relevant existing work. Results
have shown that the algorithms outperform existing state of the art by more than
30% and are highly scalable.
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5. CONCLUSION
Smart devices have revolutionized our lives and the way we interact with the
surrounding environment. What was technologically a dream twenty years ago has
now become reality, and with more and more users embedding pervasive technologies
in their daily lives, an immense number of novel applications that drastically improve
people’s everyday life are now possible. Among all, smartphone crowdsensing is cer-
tainly one of the most promising paradigms, as it allows to decrease dramatically
infrastructure costs and obtain detailed information about the phenomenon being
monitored.
This work focuses on designing mechanisms for improving information quality
in smartphone crowdsensing systems. First, a novel Framework to optimize Informa-
tion Reliability in Smartphone-based participaTory sensing (FIRST) was developed,
which leverages the collective action of mobile trusted participants (MTPs) to se-
curely assess the reliability of sensing reports. The framework was evaluated through
experiments leveraging real-world mobility traces of taxi cabs and through an imple-
mentation in iOS and Android. Experimental results demonstrate that the framework
optimizes information reliability and outperforms state-of-the-art literature.
Next, this work studied the problem of maximizing the likelihood of successful
execution of the sensing tasks when participants having uncertain mobility compete
for offering their sensing services. Two incentive mechanisms based on game theory
and having proven approximation ratio are proposed that solve such problem. Such
mechanisms were evaluated by experimenting with real-world mobility traces, and
experimental results demonstrate that the mechanisms outperform the state of the
art.
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However, there are a number of open research issues still left to investigate
for further improving information quality in smartphone crowdsensing systems. For
example, it is still an open research challenge understanding what incentive works
best to motivate volunteers. More specifically, there is currently a lack of a general,
empirical study on the motivations of volunteers to perform smartphone crowdsensing
tasks and the effectiveness of smartphone crowdsensing incentives across different
contexts. Furthermore, to date, incentives for smartphone crowdsensing have largely
been applied in an ad hoc, “one size fits all” manner, assuming that all applications
have the same requirements and people have all the same needs. Additional study
is needed to develop a systematic approach to the design and selection of incentives
that are tailored to a particular application, and personalized to motivate individual
volunteers to perform smartphone crowdsensing tasks.
In addition, one of the limitations of existing work is that it does not provide
a detailed definition of information quality, nor do they address the problem of how
to determine the information quality of sensing reports. More specifically, they as-
sume that information quality can be computed by using external functions tailored
to such purpose. However, this might not be the case when multimedia data (e.g., au-
dio/video feed, pictures) is being collected by the smartphone crowdsensing system.
In particular, when the data is coming from physical sensors such as temperature,
pressure, or light, the information quality may be defined as the accuracy of that
measurement with respect to the real phenomenon being monitored. However, how
do we define the information quality of a picture, of a sound, of a video? In such
case, the specific context of the smartphone crowdsensing application may signifi-
cantly influence the definition of information quality. Therefore, additional research
is necessary to provide different definitions of information quality that are valid for
the spectrum of smartphone crowdsensing systems nowadays available.
83
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] T. Abdelzaher, Y. Anokwa, P. Boda, J. Burke, D. Estrin, L. Guibas, A. Kansal,
S. Madden, and J. Reich, “Mobiscopes for human spaces,” IEEE Pervasive Com-
puting, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 20–29, April 2007.
[2] A. Albers, I. Krontiris, N. Sonehara, and I. Echizen, “Coupons as monetary
incentives in participatory sensing,” in Collaborative, Trusted and Privacy-
Aware e/m-Services, ser. IFIP Advances in Information and Communication
Technology, C. Douligeris, N. Polemi, A. Karantjias, and W. Lamersdorf, Eds.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013, vol. 399, pp. 226–237. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-37437-1 19.
[3] H. Alzaid, E. Foo, J. G. Nieto, and E. Ahmed, “Mitigating On-Off Attacks
in Reputation-based Secure Data Aggregation for Wireless Sensor Networks,”
Security and Communication Networks, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 125–144, 2012.
[Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/sec.286.
[4] R. Amici, M. Bonola, L. Bracciale, A. Rabuffi, P. Loreti, and G. Bianchi,
“Performance assessment of an epidemic protocol in VANET using real traces,”
Procedia Computer Science, vol. 40, pp. 92–99, 2014. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877050914014021.
[5] A. Andersson and C. Mattsson, “Dynamic interpolation search in o (log log n)
time,” pp. 15–27, 1993.
[6] K. D. Atherton, “Israeli students spoof Waze with fake traffic jam,” http://
tinyurl.com/p4gcgkv.
[7] X. Bao and R. Roy Choudhury, “Movi: Mobile phone based video highlights
via collaborative sensing,” in Proceedings of the 2010 ACM International
Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services, ser. MobiSys
’10. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2010, pp. 357–370. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1814433.1814468.
[8] C. Bisdikian, L. M. Kaplan, and M. B. Srivastava, “On the quality and
value of information in sensor networks,” ACM Transactions on Sensor
Networks, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 48:1–48:26, Jul. 2013. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2489253.2489265.
[9] J. Burke, D. Estrin, M. Hansen, A. Parker, N. Ramanathan, S. Reddy, and M. B.
Srivastava, “Participatory sensing,” in Proceedings of the 2006 Workshop on
World-Sensor-Web: Mobile Device Centric Sensor Networks and Applications,
ser. WSW ’06, 2006, pp. 117–134.
84
[10] A. T. Campbell, S. B. Eisenman, N. D. Lane, E. Miluzzo, and
R. A. Peterson, “People-centric urban sensing,” in Proceedings of the
2006 ACM Annual International Workshop on Wireless Internet, ser.
WICON ’06. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2006. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1234161.1234179.
[11] A. T. Campbell, S. B. Eisenman, N. D. Lane, E. Miluzzo, R. A. Peterson, H. Lu,
X. Zheng, M. Musolesi, K. Fodor, and G.-S. Ahn, “The rise of people-centric
sensing,” IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 12–21, July 2008.
[12] CampusCrime, “Safety on your smartphone for you and your campus,” http:
//www.campussafeapp.com, 2015.
[13] C. Castelfranchi and R. Falcone, Trust theory: A socio-cognitive and computa-
tional model. John Wiley & Sons, 2010, vol. 18.
[14] Y. Chae, L. C. DiPippo, and Y. L. Sun, “Trust Management for Defending On-
Off Attacks,” IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 26,
no. 4, pp. 1178–1191, April 2015.
[15] C. Chen and Y. Wang, “Sparc: Strategy-proof double auction for mobile
participatory sensing,” in Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference on
Cloud Computing and Big Data, ser. CLOUDCOM-ASIA ’13. Washington,
DC, USA: IEEE Computer Society, 2013, pp. 133–140. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CLOUDCOM-ASIA.2013.99.
[16] N. Chen, N. Gravin, and P. Lu, “On the approximability of budget
feasible mechanisms,” in Proceedings of the Twenty-second Annual ACM-SIAM
Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, ser. SODA ’11. SIAM, 2011, pp. 685–699.
[Online]. Available: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2133036.2133090.
[17] D. Christin, A. Reinhardt, S. S. Kanhere, and M. Hollick, “A survey on
privacy in mobile participatory sensing applications,” Journal of Systems and
Software, vol. 84, no. 11, pp. 1928 – 1946, 2011, mobile Applications: Status
and Trends. [Online]. Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S0164121211001701.
[18] J. Dean and S. Ghemawat, “Mapreduce: Simplified data processing on large
clusters,” Commun. ACM, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 107–113, Jan. 2008. [Online].
Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1327452.1327492.
[19] S. Devarakonda, P. Sevusu, H. Liu, R. Liu, L. Iftode, and B. Nath, “Real-time
air quality monitoring through mobile sensing in metropolitan areas,” in
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGKDD International Workshop on Urban
Computing, ser. UrbComp ’13. ACM, 2013, pp. 1–8. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2505821.2505834.
85
[20] E. D’Hondt, M. Stevens, and A. Jacobs, “Participatory noise mapping
works! An evaluation of participatory sensing as an alternative to
standard techniques for environmental monitoring,” Pervasive and Mobile
Computing, vol. 9, no. 5, pp. 681–694, 2013, special Issue on Pervasive
Urban Applications. [Online]. Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S1574119212001137.
[21] Y. F. Dong, S. Kanhere, C. T. Chou, and R. P. Liu, “Automatic image
capturing and processing for petrolwatch,” in Proceedings of the 2011
IEEE International Conference on Networks, ser. ICON ’11. Washington,
DC, USA: IEEE Computer Society, 2011, pp. 236–240. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICON.2011.6168481.
[22] A. Dua, N. Bulusu, W.-C. Feng, and W. Hu, “Towards trustworthy participatory
sensing,” in Proceedings of the 4th USENIX Conference on Hot Topics in
Security, ser. HotSec ’09. USENIX, 2009, pp. 1–6. [Online]. Available:
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1855628.1855636.
[23] L. Duan, T. Kubo, K. Sugiyama, J. Huang, T. Hasegawa, and J. Walrand,
“Incentive mechanisms for smartphone collaboration in data acquisition and dis-
tributed computing,” in Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE International Conference
on Computer Communications, ser. INFOCOM ’12, March 2012, pp. 1701–1709.
[24] ——, “Motivating smartphone collaboration in data acquisition and distributed
computing,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 13, no. 10, pp. 2320–
2333, Oct 2014.
[25] E2z.com, “Waze touches 50M users globally; Malaysia, Indonesia in top 10 list,”
http://tinyurl.com/lsounox.
[26] Ericsson, “Ericsson mobility report, november 2014,” http://tinyurl.com/
p3uev7c.
[27] R. Fakoor, M. Raj, A. Nazi, M. Di Francesco, and S. K. Das, “An
integrated cloud-based framework for mobile phone sensing,” in Proceedings
of the First Edition of the MCC Workshop on Mobile Cloud Computing, ser.
MCC ’12. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2012, pp. 47–52. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2342509.2342520.
[28] Z. Feng, Y. Zhu, Q. Zhang, L. Ni, and A. Vasilakos, “Trac: Truthful auction for
location-aware collaborative sensing in mobile crowdsourcing,” in Proceedings
of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications, ser.
INFOCOM ’14, April 2014, pp. 1231–1239.
[29] Z. Feng, Y. Zhu, Q. Zhang, H. Zhu, J. Yu, J. Cao, and L. Ni, “Towards truth-
ful mechanisms for mobile crowdsourcing with dynamic smartphones,” in Pro-
ceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing
Systems, ser. ICDCS ’14, June 2014, pp. 11–20.
86
[30] R. K. Ganti, N. Pham, H. Ahmadi, S. Nangia, and T. F. Abdelzaher,
“GreenGPS: A participatory sensing fuel-efficient maps application,” in
Proceedings of the 8th ACM International Conference on Mobile Systems,
Applications, and Services, ser. MobiSys ’10. ACM, 2010, pp. 151–164.
[Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1814433.1814450.
[31] H. Gao, C. H. Liu, W. Wang, J. Zhao, Z. Song, X. Su, J. Crowcroft, and K. K.
Leung, “A Survey of Incentive Mechanisms for Participatory Sensing,” IEEE
Communications Surveys Tutorials, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 918–943, Second Quarter
2015.
[32] S. Gaonkar, J. Li, R. R. Choudhury, L. Cox, and A. Schmidt, “Micro-blog:
Sharing and querying content through mobile phones and social participation,”
in Proceedings of the 2008 ACM International Conference on Mobile Systems,
Applications, and Services, ser. MobiSys ’08. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2008,
pp. 174–186. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1378600.1378620.
[33] P. Gilbert, J. Jung, K. Lee, H. Qin, D. Sharkey, A. Sheth, and
L. P. Cox, “Youprove: Authenticity and fidelity in mobile sensing,” in
Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor
Systems, ser. SenSys ’11. ACM, 2011, pp. 176–189. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2070942.2070961.
[34] K. Han, C. Zhang, and J. Luo, “Truthful scheduling mechanisms for powering
mobile crowdsensing,” CoRR, vol. abs/1308.4501, 2013. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1308.4501.
[35] D. He, S. Chan, and M. Guizani, “User privacy and data trustworthiness in
mobile crowd sensing,” IEEE Wireless Communications, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 28–
34, February 2015.
[36] K. L. Huang, S. S. Kanhere, and W. Hu, “Are you contributing trustworthy
data?: The case for a reputation system in participatory sensing,”
in Proceedings of the 2010 ACM International Conference on Modeling,
Analysis, and Simulation of Wireless and Mobile Systems, ser. MSWIM
’10. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2010, pp. 14–22. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1868521.1868526.
[37] ——, “On the need for a reputation system in mobile phone based
sensing,” Ad Hoc Networks, vol. 12, pp. 130–149, 2014. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1570870511002174.
[38] L. G. Jaimes, I. Vergara-Laurens, and M. A. Labrador, “A location-based incen-
tive mechanism for participatory sensing systems with budget constraints,” in
Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing
and Communications, ser. PerCom ’12, March 2012, pp. 103–108.
87
[39] E. T. Jaynes, “Information theory and statistical mechanics,” Physical Review,
vol. 106, no. 4, pp. 620–630, 1957.
[40] N. Jensen, “From pastoralists to mechanical turks: Using the crowd to validate
crowdsourced data,” http://tinyurl.com/zwbhk3w.
[41] S. Ji and T. Chen, “Crowdsensing incentive mechanisms for mobile systems with
finite precisions,” in Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on
Communications, ser. ICC ’14, June 2014, pp. 2544–2549.
[42] W. Z. Khan, Y. Xiang, M. Y. Aalsalem, and Q. Arshad, “Mobile phone sensing
systems: A survey,” IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials, vol. 15, no. 1,
pp. 402–427, First 2013.
[43] I. Koutsopoulos, “Optimal incentive-driven design of participatory sensing sys-
tems,” in Proceedings of the 32th IEEE International Conference on Computer
Communications, ser. INFOCOM ’13. IEEE, 2013, pp. 1402–1410.
[44] A. Krause and D. Golovin, “Submodular function maximization,” Tractability:
Practical Approaches to Hard Problems, vol. 3, p. 19, 2012.
[45] A. Krause, E. Horvitz, A. Kansal, and F. Zhao, “Toward community sensing,”
in Proceedings of the 2008 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Information
Processing in Sensor Networks, ser. IPSN ’08, April 2008, pp. 481–492.
[46] V. Krishna, Auction theory. Academic press, 2009.
[47] N. D. Lane, E. Miluzzo, H. Lu, D. Peebles, T. Choudhury, and A. T. Campbell,
“A survey of mobile phone sensing,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 48,
no. 9, pp. 140–150, Sept 2010.
[48] Q. Li and G. Cao, “Providing privacy-aware incentives for mobile sensing,” in
Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing
and Communications, ser. PerCom ’13, March 2013, pp. 76–84.
[49] ——, “Providing efficient privacy-aware incentives for mobile sensing,” in Pro-
ceedings of the 34th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing
Systems, ser. ICDCS ’14. IEEE, 2014, pp. 208–217.
[50] C. H. Liu, P. Hui, J. W. Branch, C. Bisdikian, and B. Yang, “Efficient network
management for context-aware participatory sensing,” in Proceedings of the 2011
Annual IEEE Communications Society Conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc
Communications and Networks, ser. SECON’11, June 2011, pp. 116–124.
[51] LocationHolic and FakeLocation, Available respectively on AppStore (iOS) and
Google Play (Android) app markets.
88
[52] T. Luo, S. S. Kanhere, S. K. Das, and T. Hwee-Pink, “Optimal prizes for all-
pay contests in heterogeneous crowdsensing,” in Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE
International Conference on Mobile Ad-Hoc and Sensor Systems, ser. MASS ’14,
Oct 2014, pp. 1–9.
[53] T. Luo, S. S. Kanhere, and H.-P. Tan, “SEW-ing a simple endorsement web to
incentivize trustworthy participatory sensing,” in Proceedings of the 11th IEEE
Annual Conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks,
ser. SECON ’14. IEEE, 2014, pp. 636–644.
[54] T. Luo, H.-P. Tan, and L. Xia, “Profit-maximizing incentive for participatory
sensing,” in Proceedings of the 33th IEEE International Conference on Computer
Communications, ser. INFOCOM ’14. IEEE, 2014, pp. 127–135.
[55] T. Luo and C.-K. Tham, “Fairness and social welfare in incentivizing participa-
tory sensing,” in Proceedings of the 2012 Annual IEEE Communications Society
Conference onSensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks, ser.
SECON ’12, June 2012, pp. 425–433.
[56] H. Ma, D. Zhao, and P. Yuan, “Opportunities in mobile crowd sensing,” IEEE
Communications Magazine, vol. 48, no. 9, pp. 29–35, Aug 2014.
[57] C. Marforio, A. Francillon, S. Capkun, S. Capkun, and S. Capkun, Application
Collusion Attack on the Permission-based Security Model and its Implications
for Modern Smartphone Systems. Technical Report, Department of Computer
Science, ETH Zurich Zu¨rich, Switzerland, 2011.
[58] E. A. McCartney, K. J. Craun, E. Korris, D. A. Brostuen, and L. R.
Moore, “Crowdsourcing the national map,” Cartography and Geographic
Information Science, vol. 42, no. sup1, pp. 54–57, 2015. [Online]. Available:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15230406.2015.1059187.
[59] D. Me´ndez, A. J. Perez, M. A. Labrador, and J. J. Marron, “P-sense: A partic-
ipatory sensing system for air pollution monitoring and control,” in Proceedings
of the 9th IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Commu-
nications Workshops, ser. PERCOM Workshops. IEEE, 2011, pp. 344–347.
[60] C. Meng, W. Jiang, Y. Li, J. Gao, L. Su, H. Ding, and Y. Cheng, “Truth
discovery on crowd sensing of correlated entities,” in Proceedings of the
13th ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems, ser. SenSys
’15. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2015, pp. 169–182. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2809695.2809715.
[61] C. Miao, W. Jiang, L. Su, Y. Li, S. Guo, Z. Qin, H. Xiao, J. Gao, and K. Ren,
“Cloud-enabled privacy-preserving truth discovery in crowd sensing systems,”
in Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor
Systems, ser. SenSys ’15. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2015, pp. 183–196.
[Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2809695.2809719.
89
[62] E. Miluzzo, N. D. Lane, S. B. Eisenman, and A. T. Campbell, “Cenceme:
Injecting sensing presence into social networking applications,” in Proceedings of
the 2007 European Conference on Smart Sensing and Context, ser. EuroSSC’07.
Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2007, pp. 1–28. [Online]. Available:
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1775377.1775379.
[63] P. Mohan, V. N. Padmanabhan, and R. Ramjee, “Nericell: Rich monitoring of
road and traffic conditions using mobile smartphones,” Proceedings of the 2008
ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems, pp. 323–336, 2008.
[64] H. Mousa, S. B. Mokhtar, O. Hasan, O. Younes, M. Hadhoud, and
L. Brunie, “Trust management and reputation systems in mobile participatory
sensing applications: A survey,” Computer Networks, vol. 90, pp. 49 –
73, 2015, crowdsourcing. [Online]. Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S1389128615002340.
[65] R. B. Myerson, “Optimal auction design,” Mathematics of operations research,
vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 58–73, 1981.
[66] S. Nawaz, C. Efstratiou, and C. Mascolo, “ParkSense: A smartphone
based sensing system for on-street parking,” in Proceedings of the 19th
ACM Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing & Networking,
ser. MobiCom ’13. ACM, 2013, pp. 75–86. [Online]. Available: http:
//doi.acm.org/10.1145/2500423.2500438.
[67] S. Nawaz and C. Mascolo, “Mining users’ significant driving routes with low-
power sensors,” in Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Embedded Net-
worked Sensor Systems, ser. SenSys ’14. ACM, 2014.
[68] N. Nikzad, N. Verma, C. Ziftci, E. Bales, N. Quick, P. Zappi, K. Patrick,
S. Dasgupta, I. Krueger, T. v. Rosing, and W. G. Griswold, “Citisense:
Improving geospatial environmental assessment of air quality using a wireless
personal exposure monitoring system,” in Proceedings of the 2nd Conference
on Wireless Health, ser. WH ’12. ACM, 2012, pp. 1–8. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2448096.2448107.
[69] S. Nirjon, R. F. Dickerson, Q. Li, P. Asare, J. A. Stankovic, D. Hong, B. Zhang,
X. Jiang, G. Shen, and F. Zhao, “MusicalHeart: A hearty way of listening
to music,” in Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Embedded Network
Sensor Systems, ser. SenSys ’12. ACM, 2012, pp. 43–56. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2426656.2426662.
[70] N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. V. Vazirani, Algorithmic Game
Theory. Cambridge University Press Cambridge, 2007, vol. 1.
[71] L. F. Perrone and S. C. Nelson, “A Study of On-Off Attack Models for Wireless
Ad Hoc Networks,” in 2006 1st Workshop on Operator-Assisted (Wireless Mesh)
Community Networks, Sept 2006, pp. 1–10.
90
[72] M. Piorkowski, N. Sarafijanovoc-Djukic, and M. Grossglauser, “A parsimonious
model of mobile partitioned networks with clustering,” in Proceedings of the
1st International Conference on COMmunication Systems and NETworkS, ser.
COMSNETS ’09, 2009. [Online]. Available: http://www.comsnets.org.
[73] R. Rana, C. T. Chou, N. Bulusu, S. Kanhere, and W. Hu, “Ear-
phone: A context-aware noise mapping using smart phones,” Pervasive
and Mobile Computing, vol. 17, pp. 1–22, 2015. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1574119214000273.
[74] F. Restuccia and S. K. Das, “FIDES: A trust-based framework for secure user
incentivization in participatory sensing,” in Proceedings of the 15th IEEE Inter-
national Symposium on A World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks,
ser. WoWMoM ’14. IEEE, 2014, pp. 1–10.
[75] F. Restuccia, S. K. Das, and J. Payton, “Incentive mechanisms for participatory
sensing: Survey and research challenges,” ACM Transactions on Sensor
Networks, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 13:1–13:40, Apr. 2016. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2888398.
[76] S. Saroiu and A. Wolman, “I Am a Sensor, and I Approve This Message,”
in Proceedings of the 11th Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems &
Applications, ser. HotMobile ’10. ACM, 2010, pp. 37–42. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1734583.1734593.
[77] Y. Singer, “Budget feasible mechanisms,” in 2010 51st Annual IEEE Symposium
on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS). IEEE, 2010, pp. 765–774.
[78] A. Singla and A. Krause, “Truthful incentives for privacy tradeoff: Mechanisms
for data gathering in community sensing,” in Proceedings of the ICML Workshop:
Machine Learning Meets Crowdsourcing, 2013.
[79] C.-K. Tham and T. Luo, “Fairness and social welfare in service allocation
schemes for participatory sensing,” Computer Networks, vol. 73, no. 0, pp. 58
– 71, 2014. [Online]. Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S1389128614002679.
[80] J. Thebault-Spieker, “Crowdsourced participatory sensing: applications and mo-
tivation of work,” 2012.
[81] Thermodo, “Thermodo temperature sensor,” 2014. [Online]. Available:
http://www.thermodo.com.
[82] A. Thiagarajan, L. Ravindranath, K. LaCurts, S. Madden, H. Balakrishnan,
S. Toledo, and J. Eriksson, “Vtrack: Accurate, energy-aware road
traffic delay estimation using mobile phones,” in Proceedings of the 2009
ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems, ser. SenSys
’09. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2009, pp. 85–98. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1644038.1644048.
91
[83] Y. Ueyama, M. Tamai, Y. Arakawa, and K. Yasumoto, “Gamification-based in-
centive mechanism for participatory sensing,” in Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE
International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Work-
shops, ser. PERCOM Workshops ’14, March 2014, pp. 98–103.
[84] X. Wang, W. Cheng, P. Mohapatra, and T. Abdelzaher, “Artsense: Anony-
mous reputation and trust in participatory sensing,” in Proceedings of the 2013
IEEE International Conference of Computer Communications, ser. INFOCOM
’13, April 2013, pp. 2517–2525.
[85] ——, “Enabling reputation and trust in privacy-preserving mobile sensing,”
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 13, no. 12, pp. 2777–2790, 2014.
[86] X. Wang, K. Govindan, and P. Mohapatra, “Collusion-resilient quality of infor-
mation evaluation based on information provenance,” in Proceedings of the 2011
Annual IEEE Communications Society Conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc
Communications and Networks, ser. SECON ’11, June 2011, pp. 395–403.
[87] Waze, “The Waze traffic monitoring application,” http://www.waze.com.
[88] C. Xu, S. Li, Y. Zhang, E. Miluzzo, and Y. farn Chen, “Crowdsensing the speaker
count in the wild: implications and applications,” IEEE Communications Mag-
azine, vol. 52, no. 10, pp. 92–99, October 2014.
[89] D. Yang, G. Xue, X. Fang, and J. Tang, “Crowdsourcing to smartphones:
Incentive mechanism design for mobile phone sensing,” in Proceedings of
the 18th ACM Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and
Networking, ser. MobiCom ’12. ACM, 2012, pp. 173–184. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2348543.2348567.
[90] ——, “Incentive mechanisms for crowdsensing: Crowdsourcing with smart-
phones,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, vol. PP, no. 99, pp. 1–13,
2015.
[91] J. Yuan, Y. Zheng, X. Xie, and G. Sun, “T-Drive: Enhancing driving directions
with taxi drivers’ intelligence,” IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data En-
gineering, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 220–232, Jan 2013.
[92] A. Zhan, M. Chang, Y. Chen, and A. Terzis, “Accurate caloric expenditure
of bicyclists using cellphones,” in Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on
Embedded Network Sensor Systems, ser. SenSys ’12. ACM, 2012, pp. 71–84.
[Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2426656.2426664.
[93] D. Zhang, H. Xiong, L. Wang, and G. Chen, “Crowdrecruiter: Selecting
participants for piggyback crowdsensing under probabilistic coverage constraint,”
in Proceedings of the 2014 ACM International Joint Conference on Pervasive and
Ubiquitous Computing, ser. UbiComp ’14. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2014,
pp. 703–714. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2632048.2632059.
92
[94] D. Zhao, X.-Y. Li, and H. Ma, “How to crowdsource tasks truthfully without sac-
rificing utility: Online incentive mechanisms with budget constraint,” in Proceed-
ings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications,
ser. INFOCOM ’14, April 2014, pp. 1213–1221.
[95] P. Zhou, Y. Zheng, and M. Li, “How long to wait? predicting bus arrival time
with mobile phone based participatory sensing,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile
Computing, vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 1228–1241, June 2014.
93
VITA
Francesco Restuccia was born in Locri, Calabria, Italy. He received his B.Eng.
and M.Eng. with highest honors in Computer Engineering from the University of
Pisa, Tuscany, Italy, in 2009 and 2011, respectively. He has been a research assistant
at IIT-CNR, Pisa, Italy, from November 2011 to August 2012. Francesco joined
University of Texas at Arlington as a PhD candidate in 2012. In 2013, he transferred
to Missouri University of Science and Technology, where he earned his Doctorate of
Philosophy in Computer Science in December 2016. As a PhD student, Francesco
worked under Prof. Sajal K. Das. His research interests were in mobile and pervasive
computing, wireless sensor networks, and modeling of complex systems. Francesco
has published several papers in top journals and conferences, some of which are listed
with the references of this research. Francesco has been a student member of the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) since 2015.
